Evaluating the aggregation of distributed energy resources in the italian electricity market by Babuin, Andrea
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI 
“M.FANNO” 
 
 
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE / SPECIALISTICA IN 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
TESI DI LAUREA 
 
 
“EVALUATING THE AGGREGATION OF DISTRIBUTED ENERGY 
RESOURCES IN THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET” 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATORE: 
 
CH.MO PROF. FULVIO FONTINI 
 
 
 
 
 
LAUREANDO: ANDREA BABUIN 
 
MATRICOLA N. 1130894 
 
 
 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2018 – 2019  
Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto o in 
parte, per il conseguimento di un titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o straniere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione dell’elaborato 
sono stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le eventuali citazioni 
testuali sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubblicazione originale. 
 
Firma dello studente 
 
_________________
  
3 
SUMMARY 
Renewable generation is being widely adopted throughout the world, facing a dramatic increase 
along last decade. Nevertheless, the expansion of Renewable Energy Sources (RES), due to 
their intermittent and not-programmable production, and Distributed Generation (DG), due to 
market segmentation derived by its development, originates major difficulties in the alignment 
of electricity demand and supply, fundamental to ensure grid stability. This leads to major 
complications and inefficiencies in the management of the electric system, with higher costs 
for the TSO (Transmission System Operator), which shift on the community in the form of 
general system charges. 
The introduction of Virtual Power Plants (VPP), aggregates of different production and/or 
consumption units, represents a possible solution to grid congestion. In this regard, Terna, the 
Italian TSO, is currently introducing new aggregation possibilities in the Italian power market, 
setting up the basis for an Italian Demand-Response (DR) market. 
By the release of Resolution 300/17, the Italian Authority has put in place the foundations for 
a renewed power market, allowing for the participation of both demand and small-size 
producers in the ancillary service market (MSD – Mercato dei Servizi di Dispacciamento) as a 
single Aggregate of multiple units. The current regulation is addressed to both Consumption 
units (UVAC – Unità Virtuale Abilitata di Consumo), Producers (UVAP – Unità Virtuale 
Abilitata di Produzione) and Mix of them (UVAM – Unità Virtuale Abilitata Mista). 
In order to clarify the economic opportunities of this new mechanism, the present thesis 
represents a critical review of the potential value of an UVAM participating in the MSD 
according to the current regulatory framework, defining the factors that is determining and will 
determine its value.  
Therefore, in order to present an organic and complete overview of the new scenario that the 
Italian power market is going to challenge, the present thesis is structured in the following four 
chapters: 
1. The first Chapter presents an introduction to the current market conditions, describing 
the recent energetic transition experienced in Italy, the complications derived from the 
spread of DG. It is introduced the mechanism of Demand-Response, highlighting its 
benefits in economic and operative terms.  
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2. The second Chapter describes the current framework for the Demand-Response 
Market, considering both the current European and Italian Regulatory Frameworks. It 
will be outlined the main participants to the market as well as possible market models 
for the figure of the Aggregator, and it will be clarified the main sources of flexibility.  
3. The third Chapter focuses on the MSD Market, first illustrating the structure of the 
Italian power market and afterwards defining the MSD market and dispatchment 
services. It has been provided an analysis of market fundamentals and its evolution 
concerning the last 3 years of market outcomes as well as the first results of the Pilot 
Projects provided by Terna on the Italian power market. 
4. The fourth Chapter presents a Case Study developed in order to estimate the value 
generated for an UVAM by the aggregation of different units and the participation to 
the MSD market, according to the current Italian Regulatory Framework and following 
the procedure provided by Terna regarding UVAM’s pilot project. It will be also 
exposed a Price Analysis regarding the MSD to estimate the optimal offers to be 
presented on the market on the basis of current market conditions. 
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1. POWER MARKET EVOLUTION 
1.1 ENERGETIC TRANSITION – GROWTH OF RENEWABLE 
GENERATION IN ITALY 
Along last decade, the Italian power system faced a dramatic energetic transition to Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES), due to the increase of investments in Renewable Generation (RG) 
following several legislative initiatives supported by both the European Union and the Italian 
governments (e.g. “Conto Energia”1, “Conto Termico”2). Italy implemented generous 
incentive schemes to exploit the potential of renewable energy production. Its largest scheme 
incentivised solar PV production and led Italy from a low base of installed PV in 2010 to 
become the world's fourth largest country by installations by the end of 2014. Indeed, between 
2007 and 2013, 28.587 MW of new renewable capacity was installed in Italy, more than 
doubling previous renewable installations (+234% of renewable capacity).  
Solar energy production alone accounted for about the 8% of total electric production in the 
country in 2014, making Italy one of the countries with the highest contribution from solar 
energy in the world. Rapid growth in the deployment of solar, wind and bio energy in recent 
years led to Italy producing over 40% of its electricity from RES. 
 
Figure 1. Renewable installed capacity in Italy, 2003-2017. Source: GSE, Osservatorio FER (Anie Rinnovabili) 
                                                 
1 Italian Ministerial Decree of the 6th of February 2006. 
2 Italian Ministerial Decree of the 28th of December 2012. 
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Such impressive energetic transition has been pushed by three main international economic and 
social drivers: 
• Purpose of reaching the energetic independence from fossil fuels, especially concerning 
country as Italy with limited reserves of hydrocarbon deposits, by consumptions’ 
electrification and consequent increase in electricity production; 
• Decreasing costs of RES investments. Photovoltaics’ greenfield investment costs 
decreased by 75% from 2010 to 2017, as well as wind plants’ costs, which decreased 
by 30% along the same reference period3; 
• Necessity of reducing pollution by substituting harmful sources to the environment 
(e.g. coal) with RES. 
As previously mentioned, electric production by RES showed a steady increase (+16% yearly 
from 2009 to 2014) along last decade, facing a slight decreased caused by the shrink of 
hydroelectric production from 2015 to 2017 (-22%), although still showing an increase in the 
production by other sources. Such increase of RES production has been supported by the Italian 
authorities, through feed-in tariffs and fiscal benefits, as well as granting dispatchment priority 
to energy produced by RES in power markets. 
 
Figure 2. Production subdivided across RES and electricity demand, 2009-2017. Source: GSE and Terna 
                                                 
3 IRENA (2018). Renewable power generation costs in 2017. 
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Still along years characterised by the decrease of electricity demand (from 2011 to 2014) RES 
production faced a regular growth, emphasising the transition from traditional power plants, 
which faced several shutdowns, no longer contributing to the supply of electricity demand. 
1.1.1 SEN 2030 – NEW NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 
By the release of SEN 2030, the ten-year National Energy Strategy, the Italian government 
provided new objectives in order to make the national energy system more competitive, more 
sustainable, and more secure. 
Italy’s National Energy Strategy 2017 lays down the actions to be achieved by 2030, in 
accordance with the long-term scenario drawn up in the EU Energy Roadmap 20504, which 
provides for a reduction of emissions by at least 80% from their 1990 levels. 
The Strategy sets out measures to achieve sustainable growth and environmental targets, as 
envisaged by COP215, contributing in particular to a low-carbon economy and to the fight 
against climate change. Renewables (RES) and energy efficiency will contribute not only to 
environmental protection, but also to energy security (by reducing the dependence of the energy 
system) and cost-effectiveness (by favouring the reduction of costs and prices). 
One of the targets highlighted by the Strategy is to remove every coal plant present on the Italian 
territory. In order to substitute coal’s dependency, it has been targeted a dramatic increase in 
the percentage of electricity produced by RES up to 2030 both on electric and total 
consumptions. 
To date, Italy has already achieved its RES targets by 2020, with a RES penetration of 17.5% 
in total energy consumption in 2015 vs. a 17% target to be reached by 2020. The objective for 
2030 is to increase the percentage of RES generation on total consumptions by 6% on forecasted 
production, reaching the 28% of total consumptions derived from RES. Concerning electric 
consumptions, the objective of the Strategy is to achieve the 55% from RES, increasing by 17% 
the forecast for 2030. 
Clearly, a significant amount of investments in RG will be necessary in order to overcome the 
trend, by granting incentives for power generation, placing more reliance on competitive 
                                                 
4 Energy Roadmap 2050 (2012). European Commission 
5 COP21: 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as the Paris Climate Conference (21st 
Session of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)). 
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auctions, taking a neutral approach to technologies with similar cost structures and levels, in 
order to stimulate competition and resorting to diversified support schemes for small-scale 
power generation and innovative technologies. 
 
Figure 3. Targets of SEN (Strategia Energetica Nazionale) 2017. Source: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico 
 
Such increase in RG investments will lead to a greater segmentation of the Italian power market, 
increasing the share of DG and further worsening complications and costs that the system is 
currently facing.  
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MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR TSO 
The recent expansion of intermittent RG (as solar and wind), which is predicted to continue its 
development with a steady growth during the following years, introduced several complications 
concerning short-term planning and management of the electric system. Decentralisation and 
decarbonisation are driving greater penetration of distributed and renewable energy systems 
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Actually, numerous programmable units powered by fossil sources (e.g. combined cycles), need 
to be shut down along many hours of the day because they are not anymore necessary in 
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On the other hand, programmable units powered by fossil sources, because of their 
characteristic of being able to vary rapidly and continuously the power fed into the grid, 
accomplish the fundamental task of providing balancing and adjustment services to the electric 
system. The electricity market operator makes use of these services in order to provide its 
balancing and congestion resolution services, guaranteeing safety and quality of power supply. 
The alignment of electricity demand and supply, fundamental to ensure grid stability, is indeed 
one of main objectives of marker operators. 
The current reduction of programmable plants consequently reduces the available power for 
balancing services. Differently, minor predictability of the production by intermittent 
renewable energy generation, leads to higher necessity of balancing services. 
Currently, massive concentration of RES power plants in areas characterised by low electric 
loads and inadequate grid infrastructures even lead to zonal congestions of the transmission 
system (in particular in Southern Italy). TSO thus faces the necessity of modulating the 
production of some traditional production units in order to balance the system and respect 
security constraints. Moreover, due to the significant volatility of RES production, TSO faces 
further complication in forecasting the residual loads on the system and it is thus constrained to 
acquire major dispatchment resources (with consequent higher charges) supplied by the so-
called “qualified units” (generally represented by traditional thermoelectric power plants). 
The main effects of intermittent RES generation on the safe operation of the national electric 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Increase of reserve requirements: unpredictability of RES production leads to the 
increase of errors concerning residual load’s forecast to be balanced in real-time and 
thus, an increased necessity of balancing power/tension, both upward and downward; 
• Increase of plants’ activations: the greater RES production, which reduces loads 
satisfied by traditional plants with balancing capacity, makes, all things being equal, 
technically more complex (and economically more expensive) the establishment of 
reserve’s margins, necessary to guarantee the real-time balancing of the electric system. 
Consequently, the TSO is obliged to frequently request the activation of traditional 
plants otherwise shut down; 
• Greater and different use of rapid reserves: concerning PV plants, being their production 
entirely concentrated along diurnal hours, the increase of such production gradually 
enhances the difference between minimum diurnal load and maximum evening load. 
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Such difference is linked by load/production ramps to be satisfied by rapid balancing’s 
actions, traditionally supplied by programmable power plants with high possibility of 
modulation and quick response times. 
 
Figure 4. Demand and residual load. Source: Terna and GME 
 
Because of the legislative schemes provided, and because of investment costs, the majority of 
investments in RG focused on little plants (< 1 MW), especially considering PV plants, whose 
94% of total capacity is currently represented by residential plants with power lower than 50 
kW. The same holds for wind plants, whose 81% of total capacity is constituted by plants with 
power lower than 200 kW. This confirms the substantial and rapid evolution of the national 
electricity system, which has shifted from few large-sized plants to a great deal of smaller 
facilities using widespread RES, leading to an electric system characterised by a significant 
amount of Distributed Energy Resource (DER), which in 2016 accounted for about the 22% of 
total national production and about the 26% of national installed capacity6. 
On the other hand, hydroelectric and biomass plants show the presence of significant capacity 
in high power plants, due to old plants installed before the beginning of the recent energetic 
transition. The same applies to geothermal plants, installed in previous decades. 
                                                 
6 AEEGSI (2018) – Monitoraggio dello sviluppo degli impianti di generazione distribuita in Italia, per l’anno 2016 
Demand Residual Load Demand Residual Load Renewables Renewables Residual Load Demand 
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Figure 5. Distribution of plants powered RES subdivided by classes of power. Source: GSE 
 
The reduction of generation units able to provide flexibility and balancing services has led to a 
steady increase of the costs faced by the system operator in the ancillary services market, due 
to the increase of demand of balancing services linked to a decrease of supply. These costs 
suddenly shift on the community in the form of general system charges, making the electric 
system inefficient along last years. 
 
Figure 6. Volume’s comparison between MGP and MSD. Elaboration on Terna and GME data. 
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showed a clearly different trend. In 2017 the volume of electricity traded on the MGP decreased 
by 2,3% with respect to 2012. Contrarily, volumes on the MSD faced a dramatic increase of 
about the 50,5% in the same period. 
The effect of RES penetration in the Italian electricity market is also highlighted by the analysis 
of the average hourly PUN (Prezzo Unico Nazionale) on day-ahead market. The highlighted 
decrease in prices of electricity along the reference period (2012-2017) can be attributed, as 
well as to the slight decrease of electric demand and the slight decrease of commodities’ prices, 
also to the increase of production from RES, which, facing null marginal costs and earning in 
most cases incentives for production, pushed for a reduction of prices7. 
 
Figure 7. Average hourly PUN (Prezzo Unico Nazionale) of electricity on day-ahead market, 2012-2017. 
Elaboration on GME data 
 
Thus, it is clear that the electric system requires new sources of flexibility, characterised by a 
steady and available disposability of varying flow of inputs and off-takes from the grid, to allow 
the balancing of the system. 
1.3 DEMAND-RESPONSE 
In the current context, the so-called “Demand-Response” mechanism is representing a possible 
solution to the mentioned complications of grid congestions. 
                                                 
7 GSE (2017). Il valore dell’energia rinnovabile sul mercato elettrico 
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Demand-Response consists in the adjustment in power consumption of an electric utility 
customer to better align the demand for power with supply. Until recently, electricity could not 
be easily stored, and consequently demand and supply have traditionally been matched by 
regulating the production rate of power plants, taking generating units on or off line. 
Nevertheless, there are limits to what can be achieved on the supply side, because of the 
penetration of intermittent RES in the electric system, which present a low (almost null) degree 
of flexibility, or because some generating units can take a long time to come up to full power 
or may be very expensive to operate. Thus, Demand-Response seeks to adjust the demand for 
power instead of adjusting the supply. 
Currently, there is growing consensus that Demand-Response is a significant source for 
realising an efficient and sustainable electricity system at a reasonable cost. Demand-Response 
is indeed recognised as a critical facilitator of security of supply8, renewables integration, 
improved market competition and consumer empowerment9. This understanding has been 
reflected within the European Energy Efficiency Directive and Network Codes in recent years 
and has led to the inclusion of Demand-Response in the European Commission’s legislative 
proposals on Electricity Market Design within the Clean Energy Package. In order to maximise 
the potentialities of this mechanism, participants shall converge in an aggregate of different 
generation/consumption resources, being the individual participation, although theoretically 
possible, highly impractical due to operative and regulatory barriers (e.g. Italian regulation 
provides that the minimum quantity to be hourly offered on the Italian dispatchment services 
market is equal to 1 MWh, more than 300 times a domestic unit’s consumption). Thus, the 
participation of Distributed Energy Generation (DER) resources currently requires the 
constitution of the so-called Virtual Power Plants (VPP). 
To fulfil Europe’s energy goals, the full range of demand-side resources must be enabled, and 
all consumers must have the ability to benefit from their flexibility. This will require both 
Explicit and Implicit Demand-Response.  
In Explicit Demand-Response schemes (called “incentive-based”) the aggregated demand-side 
resources are traded in the wholesale, balancing, and, where applicable, capacity mechanisms. 
Consumers gain direct payments in exchange of the variation of their consumption (or 
                                                 
8 Petitet, M. (2015). Ensuring security of electricity supply: How capacity obligation impacts investments 
including demand response opportunities? 
9 Crampes, C., Waddams, C. (2017). Empowering electricity consumers in retail and wholesale markets 
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generation) patterns upon request, triggered by, for example, the activation of balancing energy. 
Consumers can earn from their consumption flexibility individually or by contracting with an 
aggregator, either a third-party providing the management of the aggregate of different 
consumption/production units. 
 
Figure 8. Explicit Demand-Response scheme. Source: USEF - Work stream on aggregator implementation 
models 
 
In Implicit Demand-Response (called “price-based”), consumers autonomously react to 
dynamic market or network pricing signals.  
It is important to highlight that neither form of Demand-Response is a replacement for the other: 
it is necessary to enable both Explicit and Implicit Demand-Response to accommodate different 
consumer preferences and to exploit the full spectrum of consumer and system benefits10. 
                                                 
10 SEDC (2018). Explicit Demand Response in Europe 
Explicit DR:
• Aggregator bundles flexibility, optimizes and trades flexibility with BRP/DSO/TSO
• Prosumer is remunerated by the Aggregator
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Figure 9. Implicit Demand-Response scheme. Source: USEF - Work stream on aggregator implementation 
models 
 
Demand-Response thus is ideally suited to accommodate three fundamental characteristics of 
electric power systems: 
• Electricity cannot yet be stored economically, so its supply and demand must be 
maintained in balance in real time. 
• Grid conditions can change significantly from day-to-day, hour-to-hour, and even 
within seconds. Generation and/or consumption levels can also change quite rapidly and 
unexpectedly, causing mismatches in supply and demand which can threaten the 
integrity of the grid within seconds. 
• The electric system is highly capital-intensive, and generation and transmission system 
investments have long lead times and multi-decade economic lifetimes. 
Demand-Response can increase the system’s adequacy by substantially reducing the need for 
investment in peaking generation by shifting consumption away from times of extremely high 
demand. Crucially, it can act as a cost-effective balancing resource for variable renewable 
generation. Adding stability to the system, it lowers the need for must-run power plants that 
burn fuel continuously in order to be ready to supply power at short notice. It can decrease the 
need for local network investments, as it can shift consumption away from peak hours in regions 
with tight network capacity. 
Implicit DR:
• Prosumer is exposed to Time of Use tariffs by Supplier and/or DSO
Optionally:
• ESCo supports Prosumer to uses flexibility to optimize energy costs
• Prosumer pays ESCo for the service
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Apart from the indirect benefits that Demand-Response delivers to society by lowering the costs 
and optimising the efficiency of the electric systems and markets, it can also provide direct 
benefits to consumers by paying them directly for the value of their demand-side flexibility. 
Finally, it encourages market competition between different flexibility resources and market 
players, allowing the participation of independent service providers (the so called, Aggregators) 
and rewarding service-oriented retailers. 
1.3.1 CONTEXT FOR AGGREGATION SERVICES 
The implementation and development of Demand-Response services and, generally, 
aggregation services, is strictly linked to several different factor: 
• Regulation 
Regulation is the main driver for the development of aggregation services, due to the necessity 
of implementing new market models by the Authorities in order to permit the aggregation of 
different resources, which now presents regulatory barriers in most of the European countries. 
In recent years the EU Regulation is pushing for integration of aggregation services in energy 
markets and the recent Clean Energy Package encourages for the introduction of aggregators 
and active consumers in power markets as well as the development of further integration 
between TSO and DSO in the management of electric systems. 
• Technology 
Processes’ digitalisation is currently allowing for the development of aggregation services, as 
well as the steady reduction in investments costs for new technologies and innovation. The 
increasing interest in smart grids development and real time management of 
production/consumption units is furthermore increasing the propensity for the introduction and 
development of new aggregation IT services worldwide.  
• Markets 
Growth of RES and DERs contributed to the development of new energy market contexts, 
which now require new balancing rules in order to guarantee the provision of the necessary 
balancing service on the grid. The introduction of new integrated markets as well as the 
optimisation of ancillary services are necessary for the development of new opportunities for 
aggregation services.  
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Figure 10. Main drivers for the development of aggregation services. 
 
1.4 BENEFITS OF DEMAND-RESPONSE AGGREGATION 
According to the definition of Burger, S., Chaves-Ávila, J. P., Batlle, C., and Pérez-Arriaga, I. 
J., aggregation is defined as the act of grouping distinct agents in a power system (i.e. 
consumers, producers, prosumers, or any mix thereof) to act as a single entity when engaging 
in power system markets (both wholesale and retail) or selling services to the system 
operator(s)11.  
As highlighted by the same authors, it can be distinguished between three different ways of 
creating value by the aggregation of DERs.  
Firstly, aggregations create “fundamental” or “intrinsic” value, which do not depend on the 
specific regulations, level of market awareness of consumers, or technologies in place in the 
power system. It will be permanent or near permanent in time.  
Aggregations can generate “transitory” value, contributing to a better functioning of the power 
system under the present and near-future conditions. However, the value of transitory 
aggregations may wane as technical, managerial or regulatory conditions improve.  
Finally, aggregations with only “opportunistic” value emerge in response to regulatory or 
market design “flaws.” 
                                                 
11 Burger, S., Chaves-Ávila, J. P., Batlle, C., & Pérez-Arriaga, I. J. (2016). The value of aggregators in electricity 
systems. MIT Center for Energy and Environment Policy Research: Cambridge, MA, USA. 
Regulation
• Clean Energy Package pushes for increasing the role of 
aggregators and active consumers
• TSO/DSO role
Technology
• Digitalization allows innovative services
• Technology cost reduction and innovation
Markets
• Decentralized and distributed resources, RES growth
• New balancing rules
• Ancillary services optimization
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Figure 11.Value of aggregators based on technology and regulatory contexts. Source: Burger, S., Chaves-Ávila, 
J. P., Batlle, C., & Pérez-Arriaga, I. J. (2016). The value of aggregators in electricity systems. 
 
Aggregation of DERs allows for economies of scale and scope, risk mitigation and joint access 
to the energy market and auxiliary services as a way to accelerate their penetration in the 
residential, commercial and industrial sectors. An appropriate regulatory framework is essential 
to define the technical, economic and administrative requirements needed and to specify the 
role of the various stakeholders. In such manner the consumer will be allowed to access 
flexibility markets and competition will be promoted between the various technical solutions to 
the simultaneous benefit of consumers and the sector as a whole. According to the Virtual 
Power Plants (VPP) operation context, some of the managed resources can be scheduled to 
support the participation of the VPP (and its aggregated resources) in the electricity markets. In 
this way, e.g., in the case of DR programs, the consumption reduction can be used to meet the 
demand’s needs inside the network and also for the participation in the electricity market12. 
Firstly, aggregation cuts investment needs for single users, subdividing fixed costs across the 
aggregated users, while secondly it increases the revenue streams taking part in the energy and 
balancing markets. Aggregation also mitigates the economic, administrative and technical risks 
of DERs for stakeholders. This is a good way to speed up the deployment of distributed 
resources and to promote the participation of the consumer in the energy market. At the same 
                                                 
12 Faria, P., Spínola, J., & Vale, Z. (2016). Aggregation and Remuneration of Electricity Consumers and Producers 
for the Definition of Demand-Response Programs  
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time, the electricity system can access reliable technologies to balance the system at a lower 
cost. Moreover, the presence of a single aggregate of potential market’s participants allows for 
minor complications in the management of such units for the TSO. Reduction of potential 
overall transactions clearly represents one of the main advantages for the market operator. In 
order to achieve such improvement, aggregates of different units shall relate with the TSO by 
a single entity, named the Aggregator, who entitles the entire VPP and manages the flow of 
transactions, reducing the number of transactions and simplifying market conditions for all the 
stakeholders.  
Regulation has to guarantee fair price signals to avoid any antitrust behaviour which raises the 
total cost of the energy system and so increases the proportionality of what the network charges 
to consumers13. 
Aggregators are needed to capture the flexibility from many small size sources. An aggregator 
is a service provider (BSP – Balance Service Provider) who operates, directly or indirectly, a 
set of demand facilities in order to sell the flexibility available from pools of electric consumers 
and/or producers as single units in electricity markets. The aggregator, a service provider who 
may or may not also be a retailer of electricity, represents a new role within European electricity 
markets. Most consumers do not have the means to trade directly into the energy markets and 
require the services of an aggregator to help them navigate the complexity and participate. 
Aggregators thus pool many different units of varying characteristics increasing the overall 
reliability of the aggregate and reducing risk for individual participants. Aggregation service 
providers are central players in creating vibrant demand-side participation and Demand-
Response. They negotiate agreements with industrial, commercial and residential electricity 
consumers and producers to aggregate their capability to reduce (or increase) energy and/or 
shift loads on short notice. They create one “pool” of aggregated controllable units, made up of 
many smaller loads, and sell this as a single resource.  
Aggregation can achieve performance levels that fulfil market requirements for reliability and 
can be comparable to, or better than, the performance of generation. The aggregation of diverse 
customers means that the system operator can use the aggregated demand-side capacity as a 
single, reliable resource. One of the key benefits of aggregation is the diversity of the 
aggregated portfolio (i.e. many small loads building one large resource), which ensures that the 
                                                 
13 Rhys, J (2018). Cost Reflective Pricing in Energy Networks 
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committed capacity will be delivered by the Aggregator even when some individual consumers 
may not be able to perform. 
Demand-Response potential typically amounts to around 15% of peak demand. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) assessed that the potential could exceed 150 gigawatts 
(GW) by 2050 in the European Union14, even though this capacity corresponds to different 
product definitions with regard to duration and frequency of response. Demand-Response can 
be deployed at four distinct levels, with an impact proportional to the scale of consumption: 
• at the industrial level, when large manufacturing plants have the flexibility to adjust 
production processes to electricity prices to decrease their energy costs; 
• at the services level, typically through automated solutions to manage air conditioning 
or lighting systems, also to decrease energy costs; 
• at the residential level, with innovative commercial services offering consumers energy 
savings with minimal impacts on daily life, for example via smart appliances; 
• at the transport level, with the deployment of electric vehicles. 
 
Figure 12. Demand-Response and supply curve in the European Union in 2050. Source: IEA 
                                                 
14 IEA (2017). Digitalization and Energy 2017 
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2. DEMAND-RESPONSE MARKET 
2.1 EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Over the past few years, there has been an overall increase of interest in enabling Demand-
Response in several European countries. Various regulatory changes have been implemented 
or are planned in many countries. Notably, in countries where Demand-Response has 
traditionally been almost non-existent, such as Spain and Italy, there has been some regulatory 
interest in exploring its potential and providing a first execution by trial periods. The European 
countries that currently provide the most conducive framework for the development of 
Demand-Response are Switzerland, France, Belgium, Finland, Great Britain and Ireland. 
Nevertheless, there are still market design and regulatory issues that exist in these well-
performing countries. Switzerland and France have detailed frameworks in place for 
independent aggregation, including standardised roles and responsibilities of market 
participants. 
In France, a new draft decree reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat in early 201715 could provide for 
a new financial settlement framework whereby a significant portion of the payment to retailers 
with curtailed customers would be charged to retailers rather than to Demand-Response 
providers. However, issues persist around a standardised baseline methodology. 
In both Belgium and Ireland upcoming legislation should help to increase the participation of 
Demand-Response16. New legislation addressing the role of the aggregator and independent 
aggregation will soon be put in place in Belgium, which will help to provide an equal footing 
for all market actors; a strong sign for the uptake of Demand-Response. However, there are still 
some issues regarding measurement and verification that inhibit the growth of Demand-
Response. In Ireland, the new “Integrated Single Electricity Market” implemented in 2018, 
together with the DS3 programme, opens a range of markets for demand-side response, 
specifically the balancing market, and the wholesale market, as well as a newly designed 
Capacity Mechanism. 
                                                 
15 Deliberation N. 155 of June 2017 
16 SEDC (2018). Explicit Demand Response in Europe 
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Great Britain continues to have a range of markets open to demand-side participation. 
Independent Aggregators can directly access consumers for ancillary services and capacity 
products, and the country has recently started considering a framework for independent 
Aggregator access to the Balancing Mechanism. Yet, with relatively burdensome measurement 
and verification procedures in place for Demand-Response, it still has room to improve. 
Finland stands out amongst the Nordic countries primarily as it allows independent aggregation 
in at least one of the programmes in the ancillary services, and due to its advanced provisions 
for measurement and verification. It will also be experimenting through pilot projects with 
independent aggregation in other parts of the balancing market. 
Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden still present regulatory barriers which 
remain as an issue and hinder market growth. Although several markets in these countries are 
open to Demand-Response in principle, programme requirements continue to exist which are 
not adjusted to enable demand-side participation. Furthermore, a lack of clarity remains around 
roles and responsibilities of the different actors and their ability to participate in the markets. 
However, Germany, the Nordic countries and Austria have started processes to find a standard 
solution for the role of independent aggregation.  
Concerning Germany, one of the notable improvements in the path of enabling Demand-
Response is primarily due to the fact that product definitions have been updated or are about to 
be updated, and balancing reserve markets are about to be opened for independent aggregation. 
Slovenia, Italy, and Poland are currently starting the process of enabling the Demand-Response 
market in their national markets. In Slovenia and Poland, nonetheless, no major regulatory 
changes have been made within the past couple of years that would have allowed for further 
Demand-Response participation.  
Notably, Italy has slowly started to take the regulatory steps needed for a solid framework for 
Demand-Response. However, despite the gradual opening of markets, significant barriers still 
hinder customer participation. For example, major sections of the market are still closed off and 
they lack a viable regulatory framework for Demand-Response overall. 
Spain and Portugal are thus currently still far from fully enabling Demand-Response in their 
electricity markets, because aggregated demand-side flexibility is either not accepted as a 
resource in any of the markets or it is not yet viable due to regulation. 
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Figure 13. Enabling of Demand-Response in Europe. Source: SEDC – Explicit Demand-Response in Europe 
 
European policy makers have demonstrated strong support for Demand-Response and this is 
reflected in several existing legislative texts. 
The Electricity Directive – 2009/72/EC 
The current Electricity Directive of the Third Energy Package already defined the concept of 
“energy efficiency/demand-side management”, acknowledging the positive impact on 
environment, on security of supply, on reducing primary energy consumption and peak loads. 
Article 25.7 requires network operators to consider Demand-Response and energy efficiency 
measures when planning system upgrades. Article 3.2 also states “In relation to security of 
supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental 
goals and goals for energy from renewable sources, [...] Member States may introduce the 
implementation of long-term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties 
seeking access to the system”. This language was strengthened further within the Energy 
Efficiency Directive (EED). 
The Network Codes – 2009/714/EC 
The Network Codes are a set of rules drafted by European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), with guidance from the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) and the oversight of the European Commission, to facilitate the 
harmonisation, integration and efficiency of the European electricity market. These Codes, 
some of which are still in the final drafting phases, will be critical for the development of 
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Demand-Response, because they describe the terms and conditions under which demand-side 
flexibility providers will be able to participate in the electricity markets 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) – 2012/27/EU 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) constitutes a major step towards the 
development of Demand-Response in Europe. 
According to its Article 15.2, Member States were required to undertake an assessment of the 
energy efficiency potentials of their gas and electricity infrastructure, in particular regarding 
transmission, distribution, load management and interoperability, and identify concrete 
measures and investments for the introduction of cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements in the network infrastructure, by 30 June 2015. 
Furthermore, Article 15.4 requires Member States to: 
• “Ensure the removal of those incentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that are 
detrimental to the overall efficiency (including energy efficiency) of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity or those that might hamper 
participation of Demand Response, in balancing markets and ancillary services 
procurement”. 
• “Ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure 
design and operation, and, within the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, that tariffs 
allow suppliers to improve consumer participation in system efficiency, including 
Demand Response, depending on national circumstances”. 
The most important part of the Directive is Article 15.8, which establishes consumer access to 
the energy markets, either individually or through aggregation. In detail the Article states: 
• “Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities encourage demand 
side resources, such as Demand Response, to participate alongside supply in wholesale 
and retail markets.” 
• “Subject to technical constraints inherent in managing networks, Member States shall 
ensure that transmission system operators and distribution system operators, in meeting 
requirements for balancing and ancillary services, treat Demand Response providers, 
including aggregators, in a non-discriminatory manner, on the basis of their technical 
capabilities.” 
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• “Member States shall promote access to and participation of Demand Response in 
balancing, reserves and other system services markets, inter alia by requiring national 
regulatory authorities […] in close cooperation with demand service providers and 
consumers, to define technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis 
of the technical requirements of these markets and the capabilities of Demand Response. 
Such specifications shall include the participation of aggregators.” 
State aid Guidelines for Energy and Environment 
In April 2014, the European Commission adopted new rules on public support for projects in 
the field of environmental protection and energy. Among other issues, the new Guidelines 
clarify under what conditions state aid to secure adequate electricity generation is permitted. 
This allows Member States to introduce so-called “capacity mechanisms”, for example to 
encourage producers to build new generation capacity or prevent them from shutting down 
existing plants or to reward consumers to reduce electricity consumption in peak hours. 
Although the text still refers to “generation adequacy”, it requests the primary consideration of 
“alternatives” to capacity mechanisms, such as Demand-Response. The rules state that, once 
set up, the capacity mechanisms must provide adequate incentives to existing and future 
generation, Demand-Response and storage. In detail, this is clarified in the following 
provisions: 
• (221) [...] Member States should therefore primarily consider alternative ways of 
achieving generation adequacy which do not have a negative impact on the objective of 
phasing out environmentally or economically harmful subsidies, such as facilitating 
demand side management and increasing interconnection capacity. 
• (227) The measure should be open to and provide adequate incentives to both existing 
and future generators and to operators using substitutable technologies, such as 
demand-side response or storage solutions. [...] 
• (232) The measure should be designed in a way so as to make it possible for any capacity 
which can effectively contribute to addressing the generation adequacy problem to 
participate in the measure, in particular, taking into account the following factors: 
• (a) the participation of generators using different technologies and of operators offering 
measures with equivalent technical performance, for example demand side 
management, interconnectors and storage. 
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Given that a number of Member States have already introduced, or are considering introducing 
or revising capacity mechanisms, these rules will be vital to create the solid legal basis needed 
to ensure that, when state aid is permitted for guaranteeing system adequacy, it should be 
provided in such a way that demand-side resources are not excluded, and so the lowest cost 
combination of resources can be acquired. However, the real value of these guidelines in 
creating a level playing field between the different technologies depends on the Commission’s 
resolve to apply them. 
New legislative proposals in the Clean Energy Package 
The European Commission launched the Clean Energy Package in November 2016; a number 
of legislative proposals including, most importantly for Demand-Response, the revision of the 
Electricity Directive and of the Electricity Regulation. This could represent the most important 
change in the regulatory context ever seen in Europe, for Demand-Response. For example, the 
proposed text systematically includes Demand-Response as a resource in the provisions for all 
organised electricity markets, alongside storage and generation. It also requires that provisions 
for balancing and wholesale markets accommodate renewable energy sources and increasing 
demand responsiveness. Specific improvements of production definitions for balancing and 
wholesale markets are proposed, regarding procurement and minimum bid sizes respectively. 
Long-term hedging opportunities are also made tradable on exchange in an open and transparent 
manner and, where they exist, capacity mechanisms shall select capacity providers in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based process. Balancing and ancillary services, as 
well as dispatching, re-dispatch and curtailment, are generally to be market-based (exceptions 
are possible in some cases). In addition, the incentive structures for Distribution System 
Operators are to be adapted to encourage the market-based sourcing of system services at the 
DSO level. Eligible parties, including customers, retailers and aggregators, should be able to 
access relevant data based on the consumer’s consent. Finally, the proposals include the 
obligation for all Member States to introduce a conducive legal framework for Demand-
Response aggregators to foster market participation of DR, including through independent 
aggregators, enable their access to the market, and define relevant roles and responsibilities. 
Among other important aspects in the legislative package, these key proposals for Explicit 
Demand-Response are complemented by further provisions essential to enabling Implicit 
Demand-Response. If accepted and adopted by the European Parliament and Council, and fully 
Demand-Response Market  Chapter 2 
 
29 
implemented across the EU, these overarching provisions will play a significant role in 
removing the different barriers currently still existing in some countries. 
 
Figure 14. European regulation’s timeline 
 
2.2 MAIN ROLES IN DEMAND-RESPONSE MARKET 
Prosumer 
A Prosumer can be regarded as an end user that no longer only consumes energy, but also 
produces electricity.  
BRP 
A Balance Responsible Party (BRP) is responsible for actively balancing supply and demand 
for its portfolio of Producers, Aggregators, and Prosumers. A BRP is contracted by the Supplier. 
In principle, everyone connected to the grid is responsible for his individual balance position 
and hence must ensure that at each Program Time Unit the exact amount of energy consumed 
is somehow sourced in the system, or vice versa in case of energy production. The Prosumer’s 
balance responsibility is generally transferred to the BRP, which is contracted by the Supplier. 
Hence the BRP holds the imbalance risk on each connection in its portfolio of Prosumers. 
It will be distinguished between two possible figures of the BRP: 
• BRP of the Supplier (BRPsup): the supplier delegates to a BRP (named BRPsup) the 
responsibility for the unbalancing of his portfolio of Prosumers; 
• BRP of the Aggregator (BRPagr): the Aggregator delegates to a BRP (named BRPagr) 
the responsibility for the unbalancing generated by the activation of flexibility services. 
Indeed, the activation generates an unbalancing in the portfolio of the BRPsup that must 
be “corrected” by an “energy transfer” between the BRPagr and the BRPsup. 
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DSO 
The DSO is responsible for the active management of the distribution grid and introduces the 
system operation services. Flexibility obtained from the Aggregators on its network is 
purchased to execute its system operations tasks. The DSO is responsible for the cost-effective 
distribution of energy while maintaining grid stability in a given region. 
Potentially, the DSO role could supersede the classical role of the DNO (Distribution Network 
Operator) to cost-effectively maintain the distribution network, but this does not necessarily 
have to be the case; one could think of business models where these roles are separate legal 
entities. 
TSO 
The role of the Transmission System Operator (TSO) is to transport energy in a given region 
from centralised Producers to dispersed industrial Prosumers and Distribution System 
Operators over its high-voltage grid. The TSO safeguards the system’s long-term ability to meet 
electricity transmission demands. The TSO is responsible for keeping the system in balance by 
deploying regulating capacity, reserve capacity, and incidental emergency capacity. The role of 
the TSO remains unchanged, but flexibility services provides a new source of flexibility to the 
TSO as input for its system operation services. The TSO can purchase flexibility services 
indirectly via the BRP from the Aggregators active on its network. 
Aggregator 
The role of the Aggregator is to accumulate flexibility from Prosumers and their Active Demand 
& Supply and sell it to the BRP, the DSO, or (through the BRP) to the TSO. The Aggregator’s 
goal is to maximise the value of flexibility by providing it to the services defined by the 
Authority. The Aggregator must cancel out the uncertainties of non-delivery from a single 
Prosumer so that the flexibility provided to the market can be guaranteed. This prevents 
Prosumers from being exposed to the risks involved in participating in the flexibility markets. 
The Aggregator is also responsible for the invoicing process associated with the delivery of 
flexibility. The Aggregator and its Prosumers agree on commercial terms and conditions for the 
procurement and control of flexibility. 
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Figure 15. Main roles in Demand-Response market 
 
2.2.1 THE AGGREGATOR 
Adopting the definition of Aggregator promulgated by Ikäheimo, Evens, and Kärkkäinen, an 
“Aggregator is a company who acts as an intermediary between electricity end-users and DER 
owners and the power system participants who wish to serve these end-users or exploit the 
services provided by these DERs”17. 
In the current scenario, outlined by the new market models, the role of the Aggregator (BSP, 
according to the Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195) emerges as fundamental since 
responsible in the supply of flexibility services to the market by the different members of an 
UVA. Indeed, the involvement of DG and final users connected to the distribution grid in the 
management of the overall electric system leads to an increase of potential flexibility services 
implemented by the TSO. Nevertheless, on the other hand, this inclusion introduces more 
complexity in the management of several minor units (consumers and producers) by network 
operators, especially concerning the activities of metering and verifying of the supply of 
services (monitoring activities). 
TSO must be able to depend on the supply of the requested services, which must be delivered 
with certainty and promptly, because also little differences between what is needed and what is 
offered could endanger system’s security. 
                                                 
17 Ikäheimo, J., Evens, C., & Kärkkäinen, S. (2010). DER Aggregator business: the Finnish case. Research Report, 
VTT-R-06961-09. 
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Analogously, DSO must ensure that services’ supply by DG are developed respecting the 
operational limits of distribution grid’s functioning (e.g. tension’s limits). This implies the 
necessity of appropriate coordination, which must take place by adequate mechanisms and 
information exchange infrastructure, between the different actors involved in the energy 
exchanges, i.e. TSO, DSO and the Aggregator.  Consequently, the figure of the Aggregator will 
assume a central role of interface with TSO and DSO in the supply of flexibility services by 
little units (producers or consumers) connected to the distribution grid, facilitating the creation 
of a significative resource for the TSO and thus the offers’ selection by the latter. 
The services offered would result in a higher quality, because more certain, and would amplify 
the management of the electric system making the metering of the resources offered more 
efficient. The Aggregator would have the perception of all the resources contemporarily 
underlying the same hub, with the concrete possibility of modulating injections and off-takes 
by all the consumers in his holdership depending on necessities. 
Law Decree N.102 of the 4th of July 2014, implementation of EU Directive 2012/27/UE, defines 
the Aggregator as a “supplier of services who, on request, aggregates multiple consumer units, 
or consumer and production units, to sell them on energy organised markets”. Its target is to 
enhance the value of active consumers, in a market that requires organisation in order to adapt 
to the new requirements that the current context calls for. 
 
Figure 16. Aggregator’s relationships 
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2.3 MARKET MODELS FOR AGGREGATOR 
According to the USEF (Universal Smart Energy Framework)18, there are several possible 
models in order to implement the role of the Aggregator in power markets, some of which are 
already been enabled in the European framework. 
Integrated 
In the “Integrated” model, the figures of Supplier and Aggregator coincide: it is thus not 
necessary any compensation between the two parties concerning the unbalancing generated by 
the activation of flexibility and the curtailment of energy supplied to Prosumer. It is also not 
necessary the presence of the BRPagr. 
The “Integrated” model is the most adopted in Scandinavian countries.  
Broker 
In the “Broker” model, which presents the absence of the BRPagr, the Aggregator directly 
transfers the responsibility for the unbalancing, generated by the activation of flexibility 
services, to the BRPsup. The compensation between the unbalancing generated by the flexibility 
and the curtailment of energy supplied is regulated by a specific contract stipulated between the 
Aggregator and the BRPsup. 
The “Broker” model is currently not adopted in Europe. 
Contractual 
In the “Contractual” model the Aggregator stipulates a contract with the BRPagr to whom he 
delegates the responsibility of the unbalancing generated by the activation of flexibility 
services, as well as a contract with the supplier relative to the energy not supplied to the 
Prosumer with respect to the program.  
BRPagr and BRPsup, in turn, stipulates a contract aimed to the “correction of the perimeter” of 
the BRPsup. The Aggregator and the BRPagr stipulate a contract with the BSP, relative to the 
supply of flexibility sources. 
                                                 
18 USEF - Work stream on aggregator implementation models 
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The “Contractual” model is adopted in Austria, Finland, France and Germany. 
Uncorrected 
In the “Uncorrected” model, presenting the absence of the BRPagr, there is no “correction of the 
perimeter” of the BRPsup. Contrarily, the BRPsup’s unbalancing, generated by the activation of 
flexibility service of Prosumers by the Aggregator is ordinarily managed by the regulation on 
unbalancing. Since the unbalancing would support the system to rebalance, the unbalancing 
borne by the BRPsup would typically have negative sign, representing a source of remuneration. 
The “Uncorrected” model is adopted in Belgium, Ireland and UK. 
Corrected 
In the “Corrected” model the BRPagr maintains the responsibility of the unbalancing generated 
by the activated flexibility service. Nevertheless, the measure of the off-takes by Prosumers is 
“corrected”, being curtailed of the activated flexibility (aiming to the Baseline’s value), thus 
removing the unbalancing of the BRPsup and allowing the supplier to invoice as programmed. 
Consequently, the energy transfer directly involves the Prosumers, who are compensated by the 
Aggregator for the quantity of energy invoiced by the supplier, although not consumed. 
The “Corrected” model is adopted in Belgium, France and Germany. 
Central settlement 
In the “Corrected” model the BRPagr maintains the responsibility of the unbalancing generated 
by the activated flexibility service. The “correction of the perimeter” of BRPsup and BRPagr and 
the compensation of the supplier for the energy not supplied to Prosumer with respect to what 
programmed, is realised by a central subject named Allocation Responsible Party (ARP). 
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Figure 17. Aggregator model classification scheme. Source: USEF - Work stream on aggregator implementation 
models 
 
2.4 FLEXIBILITY SERVICES 
2.4.1 GENERATION FLEXIBILITY 
Concerning programmable production units until now excluded from the participation to the 
MSD because with size lower than 10 MVA, thermoelectric plants (as cogeneration plants, 
Combined Heat and Power, CHP, powered by fossil fuels as natural gas) or hydroelectric plants, 
already technically adequate and potentially able to offer flexibility services. The reduction of 
the minimum power size by the Regulator allows for the participation of this units to the MSD. 
Hence, they will contribute to fulfil the necessities of the national power system. 
Concerning intermittent renewable units, once admitted in the MSD, they will have a different 
way of participating in the market. Since they are powered by an aleatory and extremely 
variable source, they will be able to supply flexibility services only when the source itself 
presents availability. Moreover, working always at the maximum power due to the absence of 
marginal cost of production and due to the priority of dispatchment granted to renewable 
sources, they would not have any margin to supply eventual increase of generation/injection at 
the current market conditions. 
2.4.2 STORAGE FLEXIBILITY 
Storage systems can be usefully implemented in order to reduce or even resolve some critical 
issues of the electric grid. For example, the energy’s storage allows to optimise the usage of the 
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existing grid, avoiding overloads during the hours of maximum production of intermittent 
renewable sources, via the storage of the energy not consumed, which can then be released 
when the production is not sufficient. 
The effectiveness of a storage system is as much higher as it allows to minimise the energy 
produced by intermittent renewable sources which needs to be reduced in order to ensure grid 
stability. In this respect, storage systems shall provide a primary role in the integration of 
renewable sources, especially considering the ease and quickness of installation. 
The possibility of installing storage systems on the most critical portions of the grid makes them 
crucial for the reduction of current and future congestions derived by a further development of 
renewable energy plants and Distributed Generation. In addition to the mitigation of the effects 
derived by the non-programmability of renewable generation, storage systems can also be 
implemented in order to weaken further necessities derived by the massive penetration of DG. 
Indeed, such systems can be implemented to provide energy reserve and to supply balancing 
resources for the electric system. Being able to in-take and off-take energy from the grid, 
storage systems represent one of the most efficient resources for reserve services both upward 
and downward: every MW installed potentially supplies the double of energy in terms of reserve 
and balancing. 
On the other hand, it must be taken into consideration the temporal limit of the current storage 
systems, which are considered to be able to implement flexibility services for service-life of 
about 7 years. Differently from conventional plants, storage system’s functioning conditions its 
dimensioning, its service-life and its cost. 
Storage systems allow to level out consumptions and relative peaks (peak shaving), storing 
energy in periods of low needs and releasing it in periods of higher needs (energy time-shift), 
avoiding the recourse to power plants with high variable costs. This kind of service can be 
helpful for an adequate management of pronounced loading ramps determined by renewable 
source production. 
2.4.3 DEMAND FLEXIBILITY 
Differently from what is attainable for production units or storage systems, it has to be 
highlighted that the use of loads (industrial, services, residential) as flexibility resources 
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involves the possibility of using existing assets for another purpose and, in some cases, this 
presents ad advantage in terms of initial investment. 
The possibility of modulating the off-take from the grid by consumption units depends on 
several factors which together describe the “flexibility” of consumption units, i.e. the capacity 
of supplying the so-called “Demand-Side Response Service”19. Indeed, the electricity off-taken 
from the grid depends on the characteristics of the process, the technology of transformation, 
the configuration of the plant, the installed capacity, etc. 
Generally, a consumption unit can be considered “flexible” when the process underlying allows 
for the modulation of the off-take from the grid according to the technical specifications of the 
grid operator with no consequences for the final user. In this case the resource is potentially 
eligible for supplying flexibility services. 
Moreover, beside the technical feasibility of the flexibility service by the consumption unit, the 
willingness of modulating his consumption by the operator has to be considered as a relevant 
variable. Consequently, beneficial remuneration/participation schemes are necessary. 
In order to describe the flexibility of consumption units and their limits, some parameters are 
needed to be considered: 
• Response rate: considering the characteristics of the underlying process and thus the 
usage of the electricity off-taken from the grid, the consumption unit can be suitable for 
a rapid activation (instantaneous activation or within seconds/minutes) or a slow 
activation (activation within hours). Furthermore, based on the response rate, other 
parameters can be considered, such as modularity of variation or range of variation. 
The presence of an Aggregator allows for the participation of “slower” units, which 
need longer terms than what is established by Terna by conveniently placing the 
interruption/reduction of a specific load in a sequence of interruptions/reductions with 
an activation timing in accordance with the disposition of Terna. 
• Duration: according to the characteristics of the underlying process, the service 
supplied by a consumption unit can last for a defined term. Also in this case, the 
presence of an Aggregator allows for the participation of consumption units which can 
allow short-term flexibility services. 
                                                 
19 European Commission (EC), Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1388 
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• Period: according to the characteristics of the underlying processes, the provision of 
flexibility services by consumption units could be granted on 
hourly/daily/weekly/seasonal basis. 
• Substitution resources: the reduction of the off-take from the grid by consumption 
units can be realised by a reduction of consumptions as well as by the substitution of 
energy source. For example, the substitution can be provided by: 
o Cogeneration units already installed on-site with margin of production generally 
not employed (as implemented in different UVAC); 
o Storage systems employed as a backup system for electric provision in case of 
black-out. 
• Plant’s adaptation: interruption/reduction of off-takes from the grid must not lead to 
disfunctions in plant’s components or misuses along the production process (e.g. higher 
marginal costs). Consequently, investments aimed to adapt plants to the current 
framework could be needed and must be cost-efficient. 
• IT infrastructure: in addition to technical feasibility related to the underlying process, 
it has to be considered the requirement of investments in monitoring, metering and 
communication devices. 
2.5 ITALIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
By Resolution 300/2017/R/eel “Prima apertura del mercato per il servizio di dispacciamento 
(MSD)” the Italian Authority defined the criteria to allow for the participation of consumption 
units and production units until now excluded (relevant, but intermittent renewables; not 
relevant) to the MSD in order to provide balancing services. Furthermore, the participation is 
also allowed for storage systems. 
The Document provides that not-relevant, i.e. with power lower than 10 MVA, production and 
consumption units, together with relevant units (not aggregated) powered by RES, can be 
qualified for the MSD on aggregated basis, according to appropriate criteria of geographic 
localisation (Perimetri di aggregazione), constituting dispatchment points for Unità Virtuali 
Abilitate (UVA), thus setting up the first initiative to introduce the Demand-Response 
mechanism in the Italian power market. 
Demand-Response Market  Chapter 2 
 
39 
 
Figure 18. “Perimetri di aggregazione” according to Resolution 300/2017 
 
The qualification to MSD is hence extended to new subjects: Unità Virtuali Abilitate which can 
be constituted by consumption units (UVAC – Unità Virtuale Abilitata di Consumo), 
production units (UVAP – Unità Virtuale Abilitata di Produzione) or made up of both 
categories (UVAM – Unità Virtuale Abilitata Mista) and finally, UVAN (Unità Virtuale 
Abilitata Nodale) is planned for next years. 
 
Figure 19. Requirements for the qualification to MSD before Resolution 300/17. 
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In particular, the Resolution provides as follows: 
• The qualification to MSD is still mandatory for relevant production units respecting the 
requirements provided by the Codice di rete20, whilst it is voluntary for the other 
relevant production units (powered by intermittent renewable sources) and for not-
relevant production and consumption units; 
• The qualification to MSD for consumption and production units not treated on hourly 
basis is still not allowed. Indeed, the participation of these units would lead to an 
arduous management by dispatchments users. This condition at the moment excludes 
all little users of the electric system from the trial; 
• The service of interruptibility of consumption units is still not allowed for the 
participation to MSD, since it is a service negotiated outside the MSD; 
Differently from what happens for relevant units, which participate as a single unit to both MGP 
and MSD (so BRP coincides with BSP), concerning UVAs the counterparty of Terna for the 
supply of dispatchment resources is the BSP, which could consequently be different from the 
dispatchment user. 
A not-relevant production or consumption unit refers respectively to a Production Unit (UP) or 
Consumption Unit (UC) for the MGP market, whilst it refers to an UVA for the participation 
to MSD. It follows the coincidence or not between the figures of Dispatchment User (BRP – 
Balance Responsible Party, responsible for the unbalancing) and BSP (responsible for the 
implementation of dispatchment orders). 
In case BSP and dispatchment user do not coincide, for every relevant period, Terna rewards to 
the BSP the product between the volume of electricity accepted on the MSD regarding the UVA 
and the price relative to the offer. 
Assuming that the dispatchment order is not respected by the UVA, the BSP is obliged to remit 
a compensation of non-compliance to the TSO. 
Modality and obligations concerning offer’s procedure are the same for both relevant 
production units and UVA as provided by the Codice di Rete for units currently qualified for 
the participation to MSD, except for the following specifications: 
                                                 
20 D.P.C.M. of the 11th of May 2004 
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• UVA do not apply for offers of minimum or shut-down; 
• Offers of activation are reserved for qualified thermoelectric relevant production units; 
• Offers of UVA and voluntarily qualified relevant production units can be presented 
“asymmetrically”, i.e. just for one modality, upward or downward, according to the 
qualification obtained. 
 
Figure 20. Main relationships from Demand-Response scheme in the Italian power market. 
 
Following the Resolution 300/2017, the Italian Authority provided several Regulations and 
Procedures in order to clarify the mechanism of the different UVAs and activate them in the 
Italian power market as Pilot Projects. 
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Figure 21. Italian’s regulation timeline. 
 
2.5.1 UVAC 
By the release of “Regolamento UVAC MSD” on the 30th of May 2017, integrated by Terna via 
the “Procedura e regole per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento per 
l’UVAC per il periodo 18 giugno-30 settembre 2018”, the Italian Authority defined the 
characteristics of the UVAC (Unità Virtuali Abilitate di Consumo). 
An UVAC consists in an aggregate composed exclusively by consumption units, resulting in 
the same dispatchment contract. They result as an aggregate just concerning the participation 
to the MSD, whilst in the participation the other power markets, and consequently in the 
determination of unbalancing, units included in an UVAC still remain allocated in the 
dispatchment points for consumption units existing today. 
The counterparty of Terna for the supply of dispatchment services is the BSP, who can be 
distinct from the dispatchment user and is still responsible in case of non-compliance of 
dispatchment orders. 
 
May
2017
September
2017
December
2017
June
2018
September
2018
• 5th of May 2017: Arera approves regulation 300/17/R/EEL «Prima apertura del mercato per il servizio di 
dispacciamento (MSD) alla domanda elettrica ed alle unità di produzione anche da fonti rinnovabili non già 
abilitate nonché ai sistemi di accumulo. Istituzione di progetti pilota in vista della costituzione del testo 
integrato dispacciamento elettrico (TIDE) coerente con il Balancing Code Europeo»;
• 30th of May 2017: Terna releases the «Regolamento UVAC MSD» and the «Procedura e regole per 
l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento per UVAC per il periodo 19 giugno – 30 settembre 
2017».
• 22nd of September 2017: Terna releases the «Regolamento UVAP MSD».
• 22nd of December 2017: Terna releases the «Procedura e regole per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse 
di dispacciamento per UVAC per il periodo 15 gennaio 2018 – 31 marzo 2018».
• 8th of June 2018: TERNA releases the «Procedura approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento 
per UVAC per il periodo 18 giugno – 30 settembre 2018».
• 19th of June 2018: Terna releases the consultation regarding «Regolamento MSD UVAM» with the relative 
«Procedura e regole approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento per UVAM»
• 24th of September 2018: Terna releases the «Regolamento UVAM MSD».
November
2018
• 14th of November 2018: Terna releases the «Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM».
Demand-Response Market  Chapter 2 
 
43 
The figure of the BSP can be represented by: 
• A subject characterised by the ownership of the consumption units aggregated in an 
UVAC; 
• The dispatchment user (UdD) holder of the consumption facilities associated to the 
consumption units of the UVAC; 
• A third aggregator party. 
Services 
An UVAC is entitled to offer services of flexibility concerning: 
• Tertiary reserve upward; 
• Balancing power upward. 
Perimeters of aggregation 
Concerning the geographic localisation of the UVAC, only units localised in the market zones 
NORD and CENTRO-NORD are entitled to aggregate as an UVAC and participate to the MSD. 
Concerning the “Perimetri di aggregazione” provided by Resolution 300/17, consumption units 
can be located in zones 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14. 
Capacity allocation 
The capacity allocated with regard to UVAC, has been set by the Authority by the release of 
“Procedura e regole per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento per 
l’UVAC per il periodo 18 giugno-30 settembre 2018”. The Procedure set a total of 500 MW of 
capacity for the Period of Validity, to be allocated by a “pay-as-bid” downward auction, during 
which every offer must be characterised by a couple quantity-price where: 
• The quantity represents the capacity offered by the owner of an UVAC expressed in 
terms of power, not lower than 1 MW; 
• The price represents the offered premium, expressed as €/MW, regarding the previous-
mentioned quantity for the Period of Validity. 
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Remuneration 
Concerning the remuneration for UVAC’s capacity allocated by the auction procedure for 
“fixed-term” supply of dispatchment resources, it is composed by a fixed and a variable 
remuneration.  
Fixed remuneration, determined as €/MW, has been defined at the conclusion of a “pay-as-bid” 
downward auction, from a unit price on annual basis equal to 30.000 €/MW, according to the 
remuneration for the supply of analogous service in EU. 
Capacity remuneration has been introduced by Terna on the basis of possible criticalities 
derived by a lack of reserve during summer period, which could have been dangerous for the 
overall electric system.  
Variable remuneration refers to the accepted quantities on the MSD in case of activation of 
flexibility resources, with a price not higher than a “strike price” provide by the Authority, equal 
to 400€/MWh. 
Services’ implementation 
BSP is committed to present, as in the modalities defined by the Regulation of the MSD, in the 
Period of Validity, flexibility’s offers upward (which in case of consumption units consists in 
the reduction of loads in order to guarantee more available energy to the system) concerning 
tertiary reserve and balancing within the planning phase of MSD and in the balancing market, 
with prices not higher than the strike price. The quantity of energy offered must be at least equal 
to the assigned capacity and the flexibility must last for at least three consecutive hours between 
14:00 and 20:00 from Monday to Friday. Furthermore, the fixed remuneration is linearly 
incremented until a maximum value of 200% if the offer covers all the hours between 14:00 
and 20:00. 
In case the offer is accepted and the dispatchment order is not correctly executed, the owner of 
an UVAC shall be obliged to reimburse an amount equal to the product between the offered 
price on MSD (increased by 50%) and the quantity of energy not supplied. 
2.5.2 UVAP 
By the release of “Regolamento UVAP MSD” on the 22nd of September 2017, the Italian 
Authority defined the characteristics of the UVAP (Unità Virtuali Abilitate di Produzione). 
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An UVAP is characterised by the presence of only not-relevant production units (≤ 10 MVA, 
both programmable and not-programmable), including storage systems, involved in the same 
dispatchment contract. As in the case of UVAC, also UVAP result as an aggregate just 
concerning the participation to the MSD, whilst in the participation the other power markets, 
and consequently in the determination of unbalancing, units included in an UVAP still remain 
allocated in the dispatchment points for not-relevant production units existing today. 
Every UVAP must guarantee certain values in terms of modulation upward and downward, 
named respectively “Potenza Massima di Controllo” (Maximum increase of injection that the 
UVAP can, in every condition, make available to Terna) and “Potenza minima di Controllo 
Inferiore” (Maximum decrease of injection that the UVAP can, in every condition, make 
available to Terna): 
• If it has been requested the qualification to offer flexibility services both upward and 
downward, UVAP must guarantee a “Potenza Massima di Controllo” and a “Potenza 
Minima di Controllo Inferiore” not lower than 1 MW (in absolute terms); 
• If it has been requested the qualification to offer flexibility services only upward, UVAP 
must guarantee a “Potenza Massima di Controllo” not lower than 1 MW and a “Potenza 
Minima di Controllo Inferiore” equal to 2 kW (in absolute terms); 
• If it has been requested the qualification to offer flexibility services downward, UVAP 
must guarantee a “Potenza Massima di Controllo” equal to -2 kW and a “Potenza 
Minima di Controllo Inferiore” not lower than 1 MW (in absolute terms); 
Differently from UVAC, because of characteristics of rapid modulation, UVAP must present 
on a daily basis, the so-called Baseline of production, representing the overall program of 
production for all the units/dispatchment points included in an UVAP. 
Again, the counterparty of Terna for the supply of dispatchment services of UVAP is the BSP, 
who can be distinct from the dispatchment user. BSP is still responsible in case of non-
compliance of dispatchment orders. 
Services 
An UVAP is entitled to offer services of flexibility concerning: 
• Congestions resolution upward and/or downward; 
• Tertiary reserve upward and/or downward; 
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• Balancing upward and/or downward. 
Perimeters of aggregation 
Differently from UVAC, concerning UVAP, the aggregated not-relevant production units can 
be localised in every macro-zone provided by the power market. Concerning the “Perimetri di 
aggregazione” provided by Resolution 300/17, not-relevant production units can be located in 
every perimeter. 
Remuneration 
Differently from the aggregation of consumption units, concerning UVAP it has not been 
provided any fixed remuneration based on the capacity made available to the system. 
Consequently, UVAP will follow the same rules applied for relevant production units, gaining 
a variable remuneration based on the acceptance of offers on the market. The same holds for 
the strike-price previously mentioned. 
Services’ implementation 
BSP has the faculty of presenting, as in the modality defined by the Regulation of the MSD, up 
to three (four) flexibility’s offers on MSD Ex-Ante (MB) upward (which in case of production 
units consists in the increase of production in order to guarantee more available energy to the 
system) and/or downward (which consists in the purchase of electricity from the grid in order 
to guarantee a decrease of the available energy in the system) concerning congestions 
resolution, tertiary reserve and balancing services. The offer, in case of acceptance, must last 
for three consecutive hours and flexibility resources must be activated within 15 minutes from 
the reception of the dispatchment order by Terna. 
In case the offer is accepted and the dispatchment order is not correctly executed, the owner of 
an UVAP shall be obliged to reimburse an amount equal to the product between the offered 
price on MSD (increased by 50%) and the quantity of energy not supplied. 
2.5.3 UVAM 
By the release of “Regolamento UVAM MSD” on the 24th of September 2018, integrated by 
Terna via the “Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento fornite 
dalle UVAM”, the Italian Authority defined the characteristics of the UVAM (Unità Virtuali 
Abilitate Mista). 
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According to the current Regulation, an UVAM can be represented by: 
A. An aggregate composed by one or more of the following units: 
• Not-relevant production units; 
• Consumption units; 
• Storage systems, as defined in Regulation 574/2014/R/eel, “stand alone” or 
associated to not-relevant production units or consumption units; 
• One or more relevant production units not yet compulsorily obliged to the 
participation to MSD, that share the point of connection with one or more 
consumption units and eventually with one or more not-relevant production 
units and /or storage system, as long as the total power injected in the grid is 
lower than 10 MVA. 
B. One or more relevant production units not yet compulsorily obliged to the participation 
to MSD, that share the point of connection with one or more consumption units and 
eventually with one or more not-relevant production units and /or storage system with 
total power injected in the grid higher than 10 MVA. 
• The average consumption of consumption units included in the UVAM must be 
at least equal to the 50% of energy produced by the units of the UVAM.  
As in the case of UVAC and UVAP, also UVAM result as an aggregate just concerning the 
participation to the MSD.  
 
Figure 22. Possible aggregations according to UVAM’s regulation. Source: Terna 
Dispatchment point 
for not relevant 
Production Units
PU 1 
PU 2 
PU 3
storage PU 2
.
PU 4 
PU 6
PU 5
CU 1
.PU 1 storage
PU 3
I.
UC5
UC6
CU 4 CU 5 CU 6 
(INT)
CU 2 CU 3
CU 7 CU 8
SSPC
CU 3
CU 4 
(INT)
> 10 MVA
CU
RPU
PU: Production Unit
CU: Consumption Unit
RPU: Relevant Production
Unit
UVAM «A»
II.
UVAM
UVAM
UVAM
UVAM
UVAM
UVAM «B»
PU 1
III.
IV.
RPU
CU 1 CU 2
< 10 MVA
Dispatchment point for 
Consumption Units
Demand-Response Market  Chapter 2 
 
48 
Like UVAP, also UVAM must guarantee certain values in terms of modulation upward and 
downward, named respectively “Potenza Massima di Controllo” and “Potenza minima di 
Controllo Inferiore”, which present the same values provided for the UVAP. 
An UVAM must present on a daily basis the so-called Baseline of injection, representing the 
overall program of injection and off-take by all the units (both production and consumption) 
included in the UVAM. Differently from the UVAP case, the Baseline of an UVAM can have 
negative values in case of majority of consumption rather than production. 
Again, the counterparty of Terna for the supply of dispatchment services of UVAM is the BSP, 
who can be distinct from the dispatchment user. BSP is still responsible in case of non-
compliance of dispatchment orders. 
Concerning the possible composition of an UVAM, mostly the 40% of the entitled maximum 
power can be composed by not-programmable (RES) in case of entitling to Congestions 
resolution and Tertiary reserve upward. No limits of composition in term of programmable/not-
programmable units are provided in case of downward services. 
 
Figure 23. UVAM’s composition, services and modulation’s minimum duration 
Services 
Currently UVAM, according to “Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”, is entitled to offer services of flexibility concerning: 
• Congestions resolution upward (and/or downward according to “Regolamento UVAM 
MSD”, contrarily from “Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”); 
Services Upward Downward
Modulation’s minimum 
duration
(both upward and downward)
Congestions
resolution
120 min
Tertiary reserve
120 min
Balancing
120 min
Upward scalable 
power of not-
programmable 
production units 
not > 40% of 
entitled 
maximum power
Demand-Response Market  Chapter 2 
 
49 
• Tertiary reserve upward (and/or downward according to “Regolamento UVAM MSD”, 
contrarily from “Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”); 
• Balancing upward (and/or downward according to “Regolamento UVAM MSD”, 
contrarily from “Procedura di approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”). 
Perimeters of aggregation 
As in the case of UVAP, also for UVAM the aggregated units can be localised in every macro-
zone provided by the power market. Concerning the “Perimetri di aggregazione” provided by 
Resolution 300/17, aggregated units can be located in every perimeter. 
Capacity allocation 
The capacity allocated with regard to UVAM has been set by the Authority by the release of 
“Procedura per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento fornite dalle 
UVAM” for the entire 2019. Following the procedure, it will be allocated 1.000 MW of capacity 
for the Period of Validity subdivided in two main macro areas: 
• 800 MW concerning market zones NORD and CENTRO-NORD (Macro area A); 
• 200 MW concerning market zones CENTRO-SUD, SUD, SICILIA AND SARDEGNA 
(Macro area B). 
Terna provides the following products: 
1. Annual product, available from the 1st of January 2019 to the 31st of December 2019; 
2. Three interim products, for every macro area, regarding the capacity eventually not 
allocated as annual products; 
3. Twelve monthly products, for every macro area, regarding the capacity eventually not 
allocated as annual or interim products. 
The capacity for the Period of Validity period will be allocated by a “pay-as-bid” downward 
auction, during which every offer must be characterised by a couple quantity-price where: 
• The quantity represents the capacity offered by the owner of an UVAM expressed in 
terms of power, not lower than 1 MW; 
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• The price represents the offered premium, expressed as €/MW, regarding the previous-
mentioned quantity for the Period of Validity. 
Remuneration 
Concerning the remuneration for UVAM’s capacity allocated by the auction procedure for 
“fixed-term” supply of dispatchment resources, it is composed by a fixed and a variable 
remuneration.  
Fixed remuneration, determined as €/MW, has been defined at the conclusion of a “pay-as-bid” 
downward auction, from a unit price on annual basis equal to 30.000 €/MW, according to the 
remuneration for the supply of analogous service in EU. 
Variable remuneration refers to the accepted quantities on the MSD in case of activation of 
flexibility resources, with a price not higher than a “strike price” provide by the Authority, equal 
to 400€/MWh. 
Services’ implementation 
BSP is committed to present, as in the modality defined by the Regulation of the MSD, in the 
Period of Validity, flexibility’s offers upward (which in case of consumption units consists in 
the reduction of loads in order to guarantee more available energy to the system and in case of 
production units it consists in an increase of production) concerning congestions’ resolution, 
tertiary reserve and balancing services within the planning phase of MSD and in the balancing 
market, with prices not higher than the strike price. The quantity of energy offered must be at 
least equal to the capacity assigned by Terna at the conclusion of the auction and the flexibility 
must last for at least four consecutive hours between 14:00 and 20:00 from Monday to Friday. 
Furthermore, the fixed remuneration is reduced by 50% if the offer covers just two consecutive 
hours. 
In case the offer is accepted and the dispatchment order is not correctly executed, the owner of 
an UVAM shall be obliged to reimburse an amount equal to the product between the quantity 
of energy effectively not supplied and the maximum value between: 
• The average weighted price, with respect to the corresponding quantities, of the bids 
accepted in relation to the UVAM; 
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• Accepted bids’ highest price for other services in the macro zone in which the UVAM 
is localised. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of UVAs’ minimum power threshold and entitled services 
 
Both UVAC and UVAP, as provided by Terna, will cease once the respective pilot projects will 
come to an end. Starting from 2019, both will converge in UVAM pilot projects, according to 
the Procedure provided by Terna. Moreover, UVAM pilot projects are entitled for just the year 
2019, with, at the moment, no confirm concerning any possible prosecution for the following 
year.
Pilot Project
Minimum power 
threshold of the UVA
Services and mode
UVAC From 10 MW to 1 MW
٠ Tertiary reserve upward
٠ Balancing downward
UVAP From 5 MW to 1 MW
٠ Congestions resolution upward and/or downward
٠ Tertiary reserve upward and/or downward
٠ Balancing upward and/or downward
UVAM 1 MW
٠ Congestions resolution upward
٠ Tertiary reserve upward
٠ Balancing upward
MSD Market  Chapter 3 
 
53 
3. MSD MARKET 
3.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Legislative Decree N.79 of the 16th of March 1999 (so-called “Decreto Bersani”), following 
the European Directive 96/92/CE, has put in place the foundations for a wholesale electricity 
market, known as “Borsa Elettrica”, otherwise IPEX (Italian Power Exchange), answering to 
two fundamental requirements: 
i. To promote, according to criteria of neutrality, transparency and objectivity, 
competition in the activities of production and trade of electricity;  
ii. To ensure the economic management of an adequate availability of dispatchment 
services. 
The task of organising and managing the power market is assigned to the Gestore dei Mercati 
Elettrici S.p.A (GME) which, operating according to the previous-mentioned criteria, 
guarantees by its activity the security of power exchanges and the balancing between demand 
and supply of electricity in the system. 
IPEX, as well as being the location for the virtual exchange where the final price of electricity 
(spot price) is determined by the match between demand and supply by operators qualified to 
the participation, is also the location where Terna S.p.A. (the supervisor of the national 
transmission system, TSO) procures the necessary resources to provide for the dispatchment of 
electricity on the national territory. Furthermore, such location represents the physical market 
where injection and off-take programs, to and from the grid, are defined.  
It is specified that IPEX is not a mandatory market, since operators are allowed to negotiate 
trades of electricity also outside of it, by the so-called “bilateral agreements” or “Over the 
Counter OTC”. 
Market zones 
The electric system is subdivided in portions of transmission’s grid, defined as “zones”, for 
whom there exist physical limits of transit for electricity, in order to guarantee system’s security 
and efficiency. 
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Such limits are determined on the basis of the balance of power generation and consumption. 
The Italian electric system is thus subdivided in market zones, aggregates of real or “virtual” 
geographic zones, each characterised by its zonal price. 
The national transmission network is functional to the management of transits along the 
territory and it is subdivided in twenty different market zones: 
• 6 geographic zones (CENTRO-NORD, NORD, CENTRO-SUD, SUD, SICILIA, 
SARDEGNA); 
 
Figure 24. Italian geographic market zones 
 
• 8 virtual foreign zones (FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, SLOVENIA, BSP, 
CORSICA, CORSICA AC, GREECE); 
• 4 virtual national zones which represent limited production hubs, i.e. zones constituted 
just by production units, whose interconnection’s capacity with the grid is lower than 
the power installed by the units itself (BRINDISI, FOGGIA, PRIOLO, ROSSANO). 
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Figure 25. Italian market zones and interconnections. Source: GME 
 
According to the TIDME (Testo integrato della Disciplina del mercato elettrico21), IPEX is 
subdivided in: 
• Electricity Spot Market (MPE); 
• Electricity forward market (MTE), with commitment of delivery and collection, 
concerning the supply of electricity on longer time horizons than what provided by 
MPE; 
• Platform for the physical delivery of financial agreements traded on IDEX (Italian 
Derivatives Energy Exchange). 
In particular, according to art.21 of TIDME, MPE is organised in: 
• Day-ahead market (MGP - Mercato del Giorno Prima); 
• Infraday market (MI - Mercato Infragiornaliero); 
• Ancillary Services Market (MSD - Mercato del Servizio di Dispacciamento), 
furthermore subdivided in MSD ex-ante and Balancing Market (MB - Mercato del 
Bilanciamento). 
The relevant period for all the above-mentioned markets is equal to the fixed hour. 
                                                 
21 Legislative Decree 79/1999 
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3.1.1 DAY-AHEAD MARKET – MGP 
The day-ahead market (MGP) is typically the most important market of IPEX, in terms of 
volumes of electricity traded and significance of resulting prices. The participation to the 
aforementioned market, as previously mentioned, is not mandatory, since operators are allowed 
to trade electricity by bilateral agreements outside of the market (OTC). 
Within the MGP, producers, wholesalers and consumers can buy and sell electricity for every 
hour of the following day by presenting bids and offers along the relative market sessions. The 
relevant session for day D starts at 8:00 of day D-9 and ends at 12:00 of day D-1, i.e. the day 
ahead. Offers presented consist in a couple of values, quantity and price of electricity. In this 
market, as in the MI market, the transmission grid is expressed in terms of the previous-
mentioned market zones, which subdivide the grid in different portions linked by corridors with 
electricity’s transit limits provided by Terna. Such limits are determined by models based on 
the balance between generation and consumption in different scenarios, considering the impact 
of possible lack of production by some units, in order to guarantee the security of service. 
Sell prices are determined by the mechanism of System Marginal Price, i.e. they correspond to 
the highest offer’s price accepted on the market. Concerning bid price, it is always equal in all 
the market zones (PUN – Prezzo Unico Nazionale) and it corresponds to the average of zonal 
prices, weighted on the demand of every market zone. GME acts as central counterparty of 
market operator, thus guaranteeing transactions’ outcome and eliminating counterparty risk. 
 
Figure 26. System Marginal Price determination on MGP 
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In particular, during sessions of MGP, organised according to criteria of economic merit order 
and valorisation of electricity at marginal offers, RES, characterised by almost null marginal 
costs, upset the supply curve of traditional power plants, contributing in reducing the electricity 
price on the market. This phenomenon, still present in other countries’ markets and defined as 
“Merit Order Effect” (MOE), is becoming more evident because of the increase of RES 
participation in the national energetic production. 
 
Figure 27. Merit Order Effect. Source: German Renewable Energies Agency 
 
3.1.2 INTRADAY MARKET – MI 
Infraday Market (MI) allows operators to modify their programs of injection/off-take defined 
in the MGP by further offers of sale or purchase. The adjustment is allowed in order to make 
programs compatible with plants’ technical limits or to update them as a result of more accurate 
forecasts, since made approximately in real time. MI is subdivided in seven different market 
sessions and GME represents the counterparty of operators in stipulated contracts of sale or 
purchase. 
Differently from what provided for the MGP, in the MI the PUN is not considered and all trades 
are valued at the zonal price. 
According to art.52 of TIDME, in order to reflect on the MI the application of PUN to units 
belonging to different market zones, GME applies the so-called “not-arbitrage fee” to all the 
trades accepted on the market. 
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In particular, for every purchase transaction made on the MI relative to a dispatchment point 
belonging to a market zone, whenever, on the MGP, PUN was higher (or lower) than the relative 
zonal price, the operator shall pay (or receive) a “not-arbitrage fee”, equal to the difference 
between PUN and zonal price applied to every MWh object of the purchase transaction. The 
opposite applies for sale transactions. 
As in the MGP, merit order criteria holds also concerning the Intraday Market, with the same 
effects of prices. 
3.1.3 ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKET – MSD 
The ancillary services market (MSD) is the instrument by which Terna provides the necessary 
resources in order to manage and control the overall power system (intrazonal congestions’ 
resolutions, backup electricity reserves, real time balancing).  
Provision of electricity services must take place according to adequate standards of security, 
reliability, quality, continuity and efficiency by the action of the figure responsible of the 
management and control of transmission system, which must ensure the instantaneous match 
between load and generation, respecting operative limits also in case of large disturbances. 
The MSD takes place after the conclusion of energy markets (MGP and MI), where operators 
offer sale (by production) or purchase (by consumption) of electricity for the following day. 
Such market is considered almost a “real time market” because it occurs close to the physical 
delivery of electricity and because it is needed by the TSO to guarantee the safe exercise of the 
national electric system, i.e. the match in every moment between demand and supply in every 
network node, which cannot be guaranteed at the conclusion of energy markets. 
On the MSD Terna acts as central counterparty, and accepted offers are remunerated at the 
offered price (pay-as-bid) in case of necessity of resources and acceptance of the offer by Terna. 
 
Figure 28. Italian electricity market’s structure 
IPEX
Spot Market (MPE) Forward Market
MTE
CDE
Infraday Market (MI)Day-ahead Market (MGP)
Ancillary services Market (MSD)
MSD Market  Chapter 3 
 
59 
3.2 DEFINITION OF MSD MARKET AND DISPATCHMENT SERVICES  
The MSD is subdivided in two different phases, MSD Ex-Ante (Programming phase) and 
Balancing Market (MB, Real Time phase). Both phases take place in six different sessions. 
Concerning the MSD Ex-Ante consists of six programming phases: MSD1, MSD2, MSD3, 
MSD4, MSD5 and MSD6. It is provided a unique session for offers’ presentation on the MSD 
Ex-Ante which starts at 12:55 of the day-ahead with respect to the day of physical delivery of 
electricity and it closes at 17:30 of the same day. 
On the MB, Terna accepts offers of purchase and sale of electricity in order to operate the 
service of secondary regulation and to maintain the balancing, in real time, between injections 
and off-takes of electricity on the grid. 
MB is subdivided in six different sessions (MB1, MB2, MB3, MB4, MB5 and MB6) during 
which Terna selects offers regarding different timeframes of the same day of the relative 
session. Concerning the first session, the offers considered are the valid offers presented by 
operators during the previous session on the MSD Ex-Ante. With regard to the other sessions 
of MB, the general term for offers’ presentation open at 22:30 of the day-ahead the physical 
delivery of electricity (and anyhow not before the release of the outcomes of the previous 
session on the MSD Ex-Ante). 
 
Table 2. MSD market phases. 
 
On the MSD there can be presented offers regarding secondary reserve, which, in real-time, are 
automatically accepted pro rata by the regulator of secondary reserve, and offers concerning 
other services, developed in order to create necessary reserve margins and to solve eventual 
intrazonal congestions. 
Reference Day D-1
MSD1 MB1 MSD2 MB2 MSD3 MB3 MSD4 MB4 MSD5 MB5 MSD6 MB6
Session opening 12:55 ° ° 22:30* ° 22:30* ° 22:30* ° 22:30* ° 22:30*
Session closing 17:30 ° ° 03:00 ° 07:00 ° 11:00 ° 15:00 ° 19:00
Outcomes 21:45 # 02:15 # 06:15 # 10:15 # 14:15 # 18:15 #
° Offers presented on MSD1
* It refers to D-1
# Dispatching discipline
D
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In general, offers on the MSD must be referred only to entitled offers points and can be 
presented just by the respective dispatchment users. In particular, on the MSD Ex-Ante, users 
must present default offers, according to the procedures defined by the dispatchment discipline. 
GME informs Terna about the received offers on the MSD for every offer point and for every 
relevant period, and later, Terna notifies GME the accepted offers. 
At the conclusion of MSD phases, for every geographic zone and every hour, GME publishes 
the following data and information: 
• Overall quantity subject of accepted upward and downward offers; 
• Hourly average upward and downward accepted offers’ prices, as well as the minimum 
downward offer’s price and the maximum upward offer’s price accepted; 
Hence GME communicates: 
• To every operator who presented offers, limited to such offers, the accepted ones, 
specifying the amount of electricity, final hourly programs of injection/off-take and 
every other information provided by the dispatchment regulation; 
• To the dispatching user of each enabled offer point, the final cumulated hourly programs 
of injection/off-take. 
Following, are presented the services currently requested by Terna to guarantee the secure 
balancing of the system, also in case of relevant accidents, on the basis of the subdivision 
between resources exchangeable on the MSD and off-market services. 
Some of the following services are mandatory and automatically provided: being not acquired 
by Terna by the MSD are not remunerated. Other are acquired (and remunerated) on the MSD 
and provided by the units just in case of reception of a proper dispatchment order. 
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Figure 29. Services available on the MSD market. 
 
In order to allow for a simpler management of the MSD, on both the programming phase (MSD 
Ex-Ante) and real-time phase (MB), dispatchment users present offers not regarding to every 
service, but only with respect to some macro-categories. Electricity supplied is further managed 
by Terna in order to solve the different issues of the system.  
The offers that dispatchment user can present in order to supply flexibility services are: 
• Sale offers (Upward); 
• Purchase offers (Downward). 
Separated for Secondary Reserve and Other Services. 
Quantity and prices of sale and purchase offers on the MSD are to be intended as non-negative, 
with the exception of shutdown price, which can, potentially, assume values with negative sign 
and not lower than a floor price provided by the Authority (now equal to zero). 
For every Production Unit and for every hourly period of the reference day, offers presented on 
the MSD Ex-Ante phase (MB phase) must be constituted by: 
• If the unit is qualified to supply Secondary Reserve’s upward resources, 1 price 
(expressed in €/MWh) for the sale offer of Secondary Reserve, relative to the increase 
of injection for the eventual activation of flexibility resources; 
• If the unit is qualified to supply Secondary Reserve’s downward resources, 1 price 
(expressed in €/MWh) for the purchase offer of Secondary Reserve, relative to the 
decrease of injection for the eventual activation of flexibility resources; 
Market Services Off Market Services
Secondary Reserve Primary Reserve
Tertiary Reserve Tension's Primary Regulation
Congestions Resolution Tension's Secundary Regulation
Balancing Intertrip
System re-feeding
Load refuse
Load interruptibility
Services with continuative
exchange of electricity
Services for rare events
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• At least 1 and until 3 (4 in MB) couples of quantities (expressed in MWh) and prices 
(expressed in €/MWh) for the sale offers for Other Services, relative to the increase of 
injection from the highest value between the Adjusted Cumulated Program and the 
Minimum Power, until the Maximum Power; 
• At least 1 and until 3 (4 in MB) couples of quantities (expressed in MWh) and prices 
(expressed in €/MWh) for the purchase offers for Other Services, relative to the decrease 
of injection from the highest value between the Adjusted Cumulated Program and the 
Maximum Power, until the Minimum Power; 
MSD is thus a more complex and articulated market compared to both MGP and MI. The 
activation of flexibility resources is indeed strictly linked to the eventual necessity, by the TSO, 
of higher (or minor) power and consequently it is not a matter of matching offer and supply 
with specific economic merit order as in power markets. Such necessities are mostly 
unpredictable, both in term of quantity and hour of the day, making the participation to the 
MSD unfeasible as the core business of any production unit. 
Moreover, pay-as-bid methodology, with unique central counterparty, implies offer’s price and 
quantity strategy and methodology, at a higher level compared to the necessities of participating 
to MGP. 
3.3 MSD FUNDAMENTALS AND HISTORICAL DATA 
In the following section it will be presented the market outcomes of the Italian ancillary services 
market (MSD), subdivided between the outcomes of the Ex-Ante phase and those of the 
Balancing Market phase. The last three years (2016-2018) of market flows were analysed in 
order to highlight volumes of both upward and downward traded electricity, average upward 
and downward prices and the spread between such prices and the relative zonal price on 
monthly basis. The following paragraphs will present the outcomes of market zone NORD, 
being the market zone in which the subsequent Case Study is geographically localised. 
Outcomes regarding the other geographic market zones will be presented in Appendix (Par. 1-
2). 
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3.3.1 MSD EX-ANTE 
Zone - NORD 
Market zone NORD, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, represented the most active zone 
in terms of volumes along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity 
equal to 662 GWh (330 GWh upward and 332 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades 
was observed in January 2017, with 1.277 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante (823 
GWh upward and 454 GWh downward), whilst the minimum was registered in February 2016, 
with 296 GWh of electricity traded (155 GWh upward and 141 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 98,9 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 144,6 €/MWh 
in January 2017 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 71,6 €/MWh in September 
2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed a steady 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 46,8 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 89 
€/MWh in April 2017 and a minimum spread of 23,7 €/MWh in August 2018. Furthermore, the 
two prices show a positive though weak correlation along last three years (Correlation 
coefficient equal to 0,54). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 26,1 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 9,9 €/MWh in June 2016 and 
a maximum monthly average price equal to 42,7 €/MWh in November 2018. Downward price 
and zonal price showed a positive strong correlation along the reference period (Correlation 
coefficient equal to 0,72). 
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Figure 30. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
NORD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Overview 
Concerning upward volumes, the Ex-Ante market showed a monthly average trade of electricity 
equal to about 932 GWh between 2016 and 2018, with the maximum monthly volume of trades 
equal to 1.447 GWh in January 2017 and the minimum equal to 637 GWh, registered in October 
2016.  
Most of the market is concentrated in market zone NORD which represents, on a monthly 
average, the 36% of market volumes (peak of 57% in January 2017). On the other hand, the 
least represented zone is SUD, with monthly average trades equal to about 1,3 GWh, 
representing the 0,1% of the overall market.  
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Figure 31. MSD Ex-Ante monthly upward volumes subdivide by market zone, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Concerning downward volumes, the Ex-Ante market showed a monthly average trade of 
electricity equal to about 554 GWh between 2016 and 2018, with the maximum monthly 
volume of trades equal to 1.008 GWh in April 2016 and the minimum equal to 357 GWh, 
registered in September 2017.  
As in the upward volumes case, also regarding downward market, most of trades are 
concentrated in market zone NORD which represents, on a monthly average, the 62% of market 
volumes (peak of 85% in April 2018). Such concentration of trades is even more evident 
considering trades registered only in 2018, when market zone NORD represented about the 
72% of the entire market. On the other hand, the least represented zone is SARDEGNA, with 
monthly average trades equal to about 0,4 GWh, representing the 0,1% of the overall market.  
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Figure 32. MSD Ex-Ante monthly downward volumes subdivide by market zone, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
The overall Ex-Ante market value is about 1,3 billion €, obtained by multiplying the monthly 
upward trades on every market zone by the relative monthly average and then subtracting the 
product of monthly downward trades on every market zone by the relative monthly average 
price. 
The market zone with the highest market value along the period of reference is represented by 
zone NORD, with a value of about 303 million €. 
3.3.2 MB 
Zone - NORD 
Market zone NORD, concerning trades on the MB, represented the most active zone along last 
three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity traded equal to 669 GWh (165 GWh 
upward and 504 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in June 2018, with 
992 GWh of electricity traded on the MB (244 GWh upward and 748 GWh downward), whilst 
the minimum was registered in June 2016, with 478 GWh of electricity traded (131 GWh 
upward and 347 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 111,3 €/MWh (+12,5% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average 
price equal to 170 €/MWh in January 2017 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 94,6 
€/MWh in August 2016. 
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In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed a steady 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 58,7 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 91,8 
€/MWh in January 2017 and a minimum spread of 29 €/MWh in September 2018. Furthermore, 
the two prices show a positive though weak correlation along last three years (Correlation equal 
to 0,47). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 27,1 
€/MWh (+4% on Ex-Ante), highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 11,1 
€/MWh in June 2016 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 43,7 €/MWh in September 
2018. Downward prices and zonal prices showed a positive strong correlation along the 
reference period (Correlation equal to 0,94). 
 
Figure 33. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone NORD, 2016-
2018. Source: GME 
 
Overview 
Concerning upward volumes, the MB market showed a monthly average trade of electricity 
equal to about 306 GWh between 2016 and 2018, with the maximum monthly volume of trades 
equal to 506 GWh in July 2018 and the minimum equal to 200 GWh, registered in September 
2017.  
Most of the market is concentrated in market zone NORD which represents, on a monthly 
average, the 54% of market volumes (peak of 68% in October 2018). On the other hand, the 
least represented zone is SUD, with monthly average trades equal to about 0,1 GWh. 
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Figure 34. MB monthly upward volumes subdivide by market zone, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Concerning downward volumes, the MB market showed a monthly average trade of electricity 
equal to about 968 GWh between 2016 and 2018, with the maximum monthly volume of trades 
equal to 1.414 GWh in March 2017 and the minimum equal to 699 GWh, registered in 
September 2018.  
As in the upward volumes case, also regarding downward market, most of trades are 
concentrated in market zone NORD which represents, on a monthly average, the 52% of market 
volumes (peak of 74% in June 2018). On the other hand, the least represented zone is SUD, 
with monthly average trades equal to about 0,3 GWh.  
 
Figure 35. MB monthly downward volumes subdivide by market zone, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
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The overall MB market value is about 174 million €, obtained by the same procedure before 
mentioned for the Ex-Ante market. 
3.4 FIRST OUTCOMES FROM ITALIAN PILOT PROJECTS 
UVAC 
UVAC’s market is currently composed by a complex of 422 MW of capacity, assigned by three 
distinct auction procedures organised by Terna. The overall capacity is subdivided in 40 UVAC, 
managed by 21 different BSPs and localised principally in the zone NORD (34 UVAC). 
To date, UVAC highlighted a high degree of reliability, respecting the 75% of dispatchment 
orders (as percentual ratio between supplied and accepted quantities) received by Terna, on a 
total of 680,36 MWh of accepted offers. UVAC were activated only in real-time. Several 
UVAC are composed by consumption units whose off-takes’ modulation are managed by the 
internal production’s variation. 
Flexibility services supplied by units composed just by consumption units increased between 
June 2017 and July 2018, representing at the end of reference period the 25% of the services 
supplied. 
 
Figure 36. UVAC’s enabled and traded capacity, composition of units enabled, supplied and not-supplied power. 
Elaboration on Terna data. 
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UVAP 
UVAP’s market is currently composed by a complex of 94 MW of assigned capacity, almost 
entirely represented by hydroelectric production units (93%). The overall capacity is subdivided 
in 15 UVAC, managed by 15 different BSP and localised principally in the zone NORD. 
To date, UVAP highlighted a high degree of reliability, respecting the 76% of dispatchment 
orders (as percentual ratio between supplied and accepted quantities) received by Terna, on a 
total of 854,31 MWh of accepted offers upward and 25,59 MWh downward. UVAP were 
activated only in real-time. 
27% of enabled capacity is attributable to units powered by intermittent renewable sources, 
“River hydroelectric”. 
The main source in the UVAP is represented by “Tank hydroelectric” (39%), while the least 
represented is the “Thermoelectric” (7%). 
 
 
Figure 37. UVAP’s enable capacity, composition of units enabled, supplied and not-supplied power. Elaboration 
on Terna data 
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UVAM 
Concerning the procedure for term-based supply of dispatchment service by UVAM in 2019, 
which include aggregated production and consumption units, Terna assigned a total of 349,9 
MW of capacity, mostly in NORD and CENTRO-NORD market zones, on the total 1.000 MW 
requested.  
In particular, 332,8 MW over 800 MW of total capacity allocated was assigned to zone A to 
eleven different operators for a weighted average price of 29.979,7 €/MW/year, near the 
opening bid of 30.000 €/MW/year.  
Other 17,1 MW over 200 MW of total capacity allocated were assigned to zone B to three 
different operators for a weighted average price of 29.999 €/MW/year. 
 
Table 3. UVAM’s assigned capacity on first auction procedure
Operator Assigned Capacity (MW) Operator Assigned Capacity (MW)
Alpiq Energia Italia Spa 1 Alpiq Energia Italia Spa 4,5
AXPO Italia Spa 8 Enel X Italia Spa 9,7
Burgo Energia Srl 98 EPQ Srl 2,9
C.U.R.A. Consorzio 8 TOTAL 17,1
Edelweiss Energia Spa 2
EGO Trade Spa 29
Enel X Italia Spa 147,2
Engie Italia Spa 17,6
ENI Gas e Luce 2
EPQ Srl 14
HERA Trading Srl 6
TOTAL 332,8
Zone A Zone B
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4. UVAM CASE STUDY 
4.1 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
The present Case Study aims to evaluate the economic benefit of the participation to the MSD 
market by an UVAM, according to the current regulation. The UVAM analysed in the present 
valuation is composed by the aggregation of 1 Production unit and 14 Consumption units 
relative to an Hospital localised in the North of Italy.  
The UVAM presents a Production Unit composed by a cogeneration plant fuelled by natural 
gas, able to produce both electricity and heat, which currently procures the necessary resources 
for the 14 different Consumption Units, entirely in terms of heat and marginally in terms of 
electricity. Only the electrical production is functional to the participation by the UVAM to the 
MSD, therefore heat’s production is not considered concerning market’s participation. 
The present UVAM is supposed to be assignee of 1 MW of capacity by the “pay-as-bid” 
downward auction provided by the “Procedura per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse 
di dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM” for an annual product regarding the entire 2019. Such 
capacity is assumed to be assigned for the provided opening bid, equal to 30.000 €/MW/year. 
Market Zone 
The analysed UVAM is located in the North of Italy, and consequently the MSD market zone 
considered in the present Case Study is market zone NORD. According to the “Perimetri di 
Aggregazione” provided by the current regulation, the UVAM is located in perimeter 4. 
Time horizon 
Time horizon considered for the valuation is equal to 1 year, according to the before-mentioned 
“annual product” provided by Terna on the Italian power market by the “Procedura per 
l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”. 
UVAM Market 
Participation of UVAMs on the MSD is assumed as marginal with respect to the volumes 
expressed by the overall market and consequently not able to vary significantly both volumes 
and prices registered on the market along last years.  
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On the basis of this assumption, the simulated participation to the MSD market in 2019 has 
been conducted on the basis of the historical data analysed on both Ex-Ante and MB phases of 
MSD in 2018, in market zone NORD. 
Such data, as plenty expressed along the Price Analysis in the following Paragraph, has been 
analysed on a monthly basis, assuming that all days of a specific month would present the same 
specific market conditions in terms of both quantities and prices. 
It has not been assumed any difference between working days and holidays and between 
weekends and other days of the week. 
Production 
The Production Unit aggregated in the UVAM, as previously mentioned, consists of a 
cogeneration plant fuelled by natural gas, whose engine presents a Thermal Power of 1.505 kWt 
and an Electric Power of 1.415 Kwe with an overall efficiency of 85,6%. The subdivision of 
production between electricity and heat is fixed with a proportion of 0,88 kWhe (electric kWh) 
for every kWht (thermal kWh) produced. 
Plant’s production currently provides the entire amount of heat necessary to the consumption 
units, and marginally provides the produced electricity to the same consumption units. Thus, 
currently plant’s production is entirely self-consumed, since the production unit currently does 
not participate to any power market. 
The following table highlights the “Actual” production regarding 2018 on monthly basis, 
subdivided between Electricity and Heat production. Moreover, it is presented the “Actual” 
Equivalent Hours of production and their percentage with respect to the possible overall 
production, equal to the total amount of yearly hours, i.e. 8.760 Eq. Hours. 
 
Table 4.  UVAM’s Actual Production of Electricity and Heat, 2018 
 
Since current production strategy is aimed to maximise the production of heat on the basis of 
consumption units’ necessities, and electricity’s production is marginal, during summer 
January February March April May June July August September October November December
Electricity (MWhe) 866,9 850,9 935,1 449,7 22,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 384,6 767,0 539,5
Heat (MWht) 983,0 964,8 1.060,3 509,9 25,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 436,1 869,7 611,7
Eq. H. 633,5 621,8 683,4 328,6 16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 281,1 560,5 394,2
% 85% 93% 92% 46% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 38% 78% 53%
Actual Production
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months, in absence of heat’s consumptions, plant is currently off. On the other hand, production 
is almost maximised along winter months. 
Concerning the potentiality of production, the analysed production unit is assumed to be able 
to produce for a maximum of 8.500 yearly Eq. Hours (97% of total Eq. Hours) on the basis of 
maintenance’s necessities. Such potential Eq. Hours has been proportionally subdivided along 
the analysed months. 
The following table highlights the “Potential” production regarding 2019 on monthly basis, 
subdivided between Electricity and Heat production. Moreover, it is presented the “Potential” 
Equivalent Hours of production and their percentage with respect to the possible overall 
production and the consequent gas consumption. 
 
Table 5.  UVAM’s potential production and relative gas consumptions, 2019 
 
Cogeneration plant’s gas consumptions have been esteemed from the historical data of 
production and consumption, assessing an hourly gas consumption equal to 355,32 m3 of 
natural gas in case of full power production. 
It is assumed that the cogeneration plant can provide an hourly production of electricity equal 
to about 1,33 MWhe. Such production is considered equally distributed along all the analysed 
months and proportionally subdivided across all the days composing single months, not 
considering eventual variation due to external conditions (e.g. temperature). 
In case heat is not necessary, especially during summer months, it is assumed that the present 
plant would have the possibility to entirely dissipate all the produced heat with no marginal 
costs and/or production inefficiencies. 
Consumptions 
It is assumed that the analysed UVAM would maintain the same consumptions registered in 
2018. They have been considered on the basis of historical data of “Actual” consumption as 
presented in the following table regarding Electrical Consumptions deriving from the purchase 
January February March April May June July August September October November December
Electricity (MWhe) 987,9 892,3 987,9 956,0 987,9 956,0 987,9 987,9 956,0 987,9 956,0 987,9
Heat (MWht) 1.120,1 1.011,7 1.120,1 1.084,0 1.120,1 1.084,0 1.120,1 1.120,1 1.084,0 1.120,1 1.084,0 1.120,1
Eq. H. 721,9 652,1 721,9 698,6 721,9 698,6 721,9 721,9 698,6 721,9 698,6 721,9
% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97%
Gas Consumption (Smc) 256.514 231.690 256.514 248.239 256.514 248.239 256.514 256.514 248.239 256.514 248.239 256.514
Potential Production
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of electricity from an external supplier for the share of electricity not produced by the 
cogeneration plant. 
 
Table 6. UVAM’s Actual Electricity Consumptions (Purchase), 2018 
 
As previously mentioned, if the production of electricity by the Production Unit is not sufficient 
to cover the full needs of electricity by the related Consumption Units, the remaining part of 
electricity is acquired. 
Thus, overall electricity consumptions considered are a sum between electricity production and 
electricity purchase. 
 
Table 7. UVAM’s overall Electricity Consumptions 
 
Such consumptions have been equally and constantly subdivided along all the days composing 
the reference months. 
Market participation 
It is assumed that the present UVAM is able to present upward offers for the entire 2019 on the 
MSD, in all the 365 days composing the year (from Monday to Sunday, weekly). 
The UVAM is considered entitled, as provided by the regulation, to present upward offers on 
the MSD (both Ex-Ante and MB phase) for a minimum hourly capacity equal to the capacity 
assigned as a result of the pay-as-bid auction, corresponding to 1 MW. 
MWh January February March April May June July August September October November December Year
Hospital 185,5 131,4 119,4 606,1 1.189,4 1.318,0 1.519,7 1.333,0 1.106,5 603,7 290,0 643,1 9.045,9
Unit 1 9,1 8,7 10,0 7,8 9,0 12,6 19,1 15,2 8,0 9,6 10,3 10,6 129,9
Unit 2 16,2 14,7 16,6 17,1 16,8 14,2 15,2 16,2 15,5 12,4 13,7 14,9 183,4
Unit 3 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,7 1,4 1,5 3,4 1,8 1,4 2,0 1,7 1,8 21,2
Unit 4 1,7 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,7 2,0 1,8 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 19,7
Unit 5 6,2 5,4 5,2 5,0 5,1 5,0 5,8 4,8 4,8 5,2 5,3 5,7 63,4
Unit 6 1,7 1,5 1,6 1,4 1,3 2,0 3,4 2,4 1,5 1,5 1,6 1,6 21,5
Unit 7 3,3 3,1 3,5 3,4 6,3 9,5 12,4 8,9 5,2 3,5 3,6 3,8 66,6
Unit 8 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 1,0
Unit 9 8,9 8,1 8,9 8,6 2,0 3,9 5,0 5,0 2,8 2,5 2,4 2,9 61,1
Unit 10 5,5 4,9 5,4 5,2 5,2 4,9 5,3 5,0 5,0 5,5 5,3 5,6 62,8
Unit 11 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,2 1,3 0,5 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,7 6,0
Unit 12 0,5 0,5 0,5 1,0 1,1 1,7 4,1 3,2 2,2 2,6 3,6 0,1 21,1
Unit 13 5,8 5,8 5,8 3,2 2,7 3,0 8,9 7,8 5,4 4,5 5,4 8,3 66,5
TOTAL 246,8 187,7 180,4 662,6 1.242,0 1.378,2 1.605,6 1.405,7 1.160,2 654,8 345,0 700,9 9.770,1
Actual Electricity Consumptions
MWh January February March April May June July August September October November December Year
Purchase 246,8 187,7 180,4 662,6 1.242,0 1.378,2 1.605,6 1.405,7 1.160,2 654,8 345,0 700,9 9.770,1
Production 866,9 850,9 935,1 449,7 22,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 384,6 767,0 539,5 4.816,4
TOTAL 1.113,8 1.038,7 1.115,6 1.112,3 1.264,6 1.378,2 1.605,6 1.405,7 1.160,2 1.039,4 1.112,0 1.240,4 14.586,5
Overall Electricity Consumptions
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Besides the obligation of offering at least the minimum quantity assigned, for 4 consecutive 
hours, between 14:00 and 20:00, it has been assumed that the UVAM would be able to present 
a total of 6 offers on a single day throughout the year. Such market participation has been 
supposed constant for all the months considered along 2019.  
Revenues 
Revenues considered in the present Case Study are subdivided between: 
• Fixed Remuneration 
Concerning the fixed remuneration provided by the current regulation in case of allocation of 
capacity according to the “Procedura per l’approvvigionamento a termine di risorse di 
dispacciamento fornite dalle UVAM”. It is considered equal to 30.000 €/MW/year and equally 
subdivided across all days composing the analysed year.  
• Variable Remuneration 
Relative to the remuneration of the flexibility resources offered on the MSD, according to 
dispatchment regulation, in case of acceptance of the offer by Terna. The evaluation of offer’s 
value and consequent variable remuneration is largely presented in the following Price 
Analysis. 
Costs 
Costs considered in the present Case Study are subdivided between OpeX and CapEx as 
follows: 
• OpEx 
o Electricity Purchase 
Concerning costs faced by the UVAM in case of acquisition of electricity resources from 
external supplier. Such cost has been evaluated on the basis of the historical average monthly 
costs as shown in the following table. 
UVAM Case Study  Chapter 4 
 
78 
 
Table 8. UVAM’s Actual Electricity Purchase costs (Purchase), 2018 
 
Eventual costs of purchase of electricity faced due to the activation of flexibility resources has 
been linearly valuated at the relative average monthly cost. 
o Gas Consumption 
Relative to the production cost faced by the UVAM by the cogeneration plant. Such cost has 
been considered on the basis of the historical cost faced by the units composing the UVAM, 
equal to 0,3988 €/per cubic meter as shown in the following table. 
 
Table 9. UVAM’s Actual Gas consumptions and Costs of Production, 2018 
 
Eventual marginal costs of production faced due to the activation of flexibility resources has 
been linearly valuated at the previous-mentioned cost. 
o Increased Maintenance 
With reference to the assumption of the necessity of increased maintenance for the cogeneration 
plant, necessary due to the higher utilisation of the productive unit with respect to the current 
scenario. Such cost has been considered equal to 5.000 €/year on the basis of the average market 
costs and has been equally subdivided across all the months of the valuation. 
 
 
€ January February March April May June July August September October November December Year
Hospital 38.625,6 30.039,0 26.789,4 110.036,9 199.871,7 215.115,1 210.443,2 244.042,9 182.123,2 99.441,9 52.715,4 109.846,9 1.519.091,4
Unit 1 1.967,6 1.855,5 2.094,2 1.610,7 1.903,4 2.692,3 4.146,7 3.269,1 1.680,9 1.886,2 2.027,4 2.016,8 27.150,9
Unit 2 3.377,2 3.060,1 3.355,3 3.404,0 3.282,4 2.769,9 2.689,6 3.328,1 2.387,8 2.931,2 2.627,7 2.804,9 36.018,3
Unit 3 414,4 394,2 313,5 384,0 308,0 344,1 348,4 809,9 304,3 446,0 428,7 344,1 4.839,8
Unit 4 439,5 400,5 386,9 372,8 374,4 420,5 486,0 425,9 379,5 396,2 383,6 402,2 4.868,1
Unit 5 1.355,1 1.205,9 1.096,5 1.144,6 1.052,2 1.040,8 1.013,6 1.183,1 975,4 1.052,8 1.052,6 1.200,1 13.372,8
Unit 6 427,9 387,0 384,1 342,5 323,5 452,3 726,3 518,3 362,9 360,1 375,7 370,2 5.030,8
Unit 7 759,6 702,4 955,8 944,7 976,0 1.993,9 2.599,3 1.839,4 1.113,6 744,0 675,8 859,3 14.163,8
Unit 8 44,9 44,3 44,3 44,2 44,0 43,8 44,3 43,9 43,9 44,4 44,2 44,4 530,6
Unit 9 1.924,6 1.737,9 1.924,6 1.862,3 440,7 844,8 1.072,9 1.072,9 610,2 537,7 528,6 451,3 13.008,6
Unit 10 1.217,8 1.084,5 1.157,1 1.103,6 1.075,1 1.018,1 984,4 1.119,6 1.018,1 1.103,8 1.088,6 1.055,2 13.025,7
Unit 11 123,1 112,0 117,1 107,5 203,6 83,0 94,8 344,8 87,2 90,4 90,0 172,0 1.625,4
Unit 12 132,9 132,9 132,9 245,5 257,7 409,2 1.002,1 772,7 528,7 634,4 885,0 812,6 5.946,5
Unit 13 1.266,7 1.266,7 1.266,7 708,4 584,4 649,4 1.950,9 1.717,3 1.188,5 989,5 1.184,5 1.742,0 14.514,9
TOTAL 52.076,9 42.422,9 40.018,5 122.311,6 210.697,2 227.877,2 227.602,6 260.488,1 192.804,1 110.658,6 64.107,8 122.122,0 1.673.187,5
€/MWh January February March April May June July August September October November December
Avg Cost 211,0 226,0 221,8 184,6 169,6 165,3 141,8 185,3 166,2 169,0 185,8 174,2
Electricity Purchase Costs
January February March April May June July August September October November December Year
Smc 225.109 220.955 242.821 116.768 5.851 0 0 0 0 99.866 199.162 140.084 1.250.616
€/Smc 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988 0,3988
€ 89.773,5 88.116,9 96.837,0 46.567,1 2.333,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 39.826,6 79.425,8 55.865,5 498.746
Actual Gas Consumptions and Costs
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• CapEx 
o Adjustment Costs 
With reference to the assumption of the necessity of minor adjustments in the cogeneration 
plant in order to allow for higher variation of production flows with respect to the current 
scenario. The aforementioned adjustments are required to permit quick increase of production 
in case of the reception of dispatchment orders by Terna following the acceptance of an offer 
on the MSD. Such cost has been considered equal to 10.000 € on the basis of the average market 
costs and has been equally subdivided across all the months of the valuation. 
o Control room setting up 
With reference to the mandatory setting up of a control room as provided by the current 
regulation, in order to request the qualification to the MSD via the Pilot Projects. Such control 
room consists in a physical control point, i.e. a continually controlled emplacement by which 
receiving and carrying out dispatchment orders.  
The cost of setting up the control room has been considered equal to 5.000 € on the basis of the 
average market costs and has been equally subdivided across all the months of the valuation. 
4.2 MSD PRICE ANALYSIS 
The objective of the present analysis is to identify the optimal offer’s price to be presented on 
the MSD by the UVAM object of the simulation, for every month of the yearly valuation. 
The aim is to construct, on the basis of the accepted upward offers registered for every month 
in market zone NORD (localisation of the UVAM) in 2018, a distribution function to evaluate 
the probability of acceptance of an upward offer presented by the UVAM. Such problem is 
managed with a non-parametric statistical modelling approach. 
Accepted upward offers in 2018 on both MSD Ex-Ante and MB were considered on monthly 
basis, with size, in terms of quantity (MW) offered, greater or equal to 1 MW. Concerning 
December, it has been considered only the MSD Ex-Ante because at the date of the analysis 
MB data were still not available. 
The analysis is constructed on the assumption that, since, as previously mentioned, UVAM 
market is considered marginal with respect to MSD dynamics, the presentation of an offer with 
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the same couple of price-quantity of offers accepted in 2018 would have the same probability 
of acceptance in 2019, reference year of the valuation. 
It is assumed that offers with size equal to N MW are equivalent to N offers with size equal to 
1 MW. Therefore, it is also assumed that the probability of acceptance of 1 offer with size equal 
to N MW has the same probability of acceptance of N offers with size equal to 1 MW. 
Consequently, it has been distinguished between “Offers” and “Standardised Offers”. 
In the identification of the optimal offer, only “Standardised Offers” have been considered, for 
every month of 2018, from the minimum accepted price to the maximum accepted price on both 
market phases. 
In the following table it is presented the number of upward accepted offers considered in the 
analysis for every month of 2018, distinguished between “Offers” and “Standardised Offers”. 
 
Table 10. Number of Offers and Standardised Offers, market zone NORD, considered in Price Analysis. Source: 
Offerte Pubbliche MSD - 2018, GME 
 
In the following figure are presented all the accepted upward Standardised Offers per price in 
January 2018 (including zeros), from the minimum accepted price (60 €/MWh) to the maximum 
accepted price (468 €/MWh). 
January 28.284 517.328
February 27.223 557.969
March 29.868 702.582
April 19.495 327.271
May 19.938 376.508
June 28.488 493.615
July 33.267 651.412
August 25.462 527.431
September 27.024 635.508
October 31.880 621.238
November 26.165 489.761
December* 5.533 340.201
TOTAL 302.627 6.240.824
*Only MSD Ex-Ante
Month
N. Standardised
Offers
N. Offers
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Figure 38. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – January 2018 
 
Once data are modelled, it has to be considered that the lower the price, the higher the 
probability that an offer is accepted. Such consideration can be translated in a statistical 
valuation by using the cumulated density resulting from the data highlighted in the histogram 
of Figure 38. 
Starting from the accepted offers’ distribution, it can be defined a cumulative distribution 
function, and, from it, it has been defined a Probability Distribution Function by dividing the 
number of observations of every single price for the number of total observations. 
 
Figure 39. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers – January 2018 
 
The complement of the previous function is the function able to associate to every price the 
probability of acceptance for an offer corresponding to such price on the basis of the data 
registered on the MSD in 2018. 
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Figure 40. Complement of PDF, Probability of Acceptance for Standardised Offers – January 2018 
 
It is noticeable how the probability of acceptance goes from 95% to 10% in a range of 30 
€/MWh, from 79 €/MWh to 109 €/MWh because of the high frequency of offers in the 
mentioned interval. 
Once obtained the probability associated to every price, it has been introduced the variable of 
the “Offer Cost”, intended as the cost derived by the activation of flexibility resources in case 
of acceptance of the offer on the MSD. 
Such cost is a combination of the cost of purchasing further electricity (or the savings of 
purchasing fewer electricity), necessary to maintain a fixed level of consumption and present 
an upward offer, and the marginal cost of producing the necessary additional electricity. The 
Offer Cost largely varies along the year, because of the different actual flows of purchase of 
electricity and the different production’s intensity on monthly basis.  
Winter months, characterised by a significant production intensity, present a high Offer Cost as 
a consequence of the necessity of acquiring large quantities of electricity at high price in order 
to present offers with size equal to 1 MW on the MSD. On the other hand, summer months, 
characterised by the current absence of production, present a low Offer Cost, as a result of minor 
acquisitions of electricity. 
In the following table are presented the different Offer Costs associated to every month of 2018. 
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Table 11. UVAM’s Electricity (Purchase) cost, Production cost and resulting Opportunity Cost for every month 
of 2019 
 
It has to be considered that Offer Cost is faced by the UVAM with the same frequency of the 
acceptance of the dispatchment offer on MSD, i.e. the probability of acceptance, since it is 
generated by the activation of flexibility resources formerly requested by Terna in case of 
acceptance, by its dispatchment order. 
Moreover, offer’s value is estimated as the product between its price and correspondent 
probability of acceptance. The same applies for the evaluation of Offer Cost. 
𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓′𝒔 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 = 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃. 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 
Consequently, the optimal offer’s price to be presented on the MSD by the UVAM, is the one 
which maximises the difference between the product of offer’s price and probability of 
acceptance and the product of Offer Cost and probability of acceptance. 
𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 = 𝑴𝒂𝒙 (𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃. 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 − 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃. 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆) 
Such analysis has been provided for every month, highlighting the maximum value of the 
before-mentioned product, as shown in the following table concerning January 2018. 
Results of the analysis regarding all months of 2019 are presented in Appendix (Par. 3). 
Production
Cost (€/MWh)
January 211 € 104 € 194 €
February 226 € 104 € 218 €
March 222 € 104 € 213 €
April 185 € 104 € 128 €
May 170 € 104 € 84 €
June 165 € 104 € 83 €
July 142 € 104 € 91 €
August 185 € 104 € 77 €
September 166 € 104 € 83 €
October 169 € 104 € 116 €
November 186 € 104 € 164 €
December 174 € 104 € 132 €
Month
Offer Cost
Electricity 
Cost (€/MWh)
Offer
Cost (€/MWh)
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Table 12. UVAM’s maximum offer value – January 
 
In the following table it is presented the optimal offer to be presented on the MSD and the 
associated probability of acceptance for every month. 
 
Table 13. UVAM’s optimal Offer on MSD and Probability of Acceptance for every month of 2019 
 
4.3 HOSPITAL CASE 
The valuation of the economic benefit for the UVAM of participating to the MSD market, 
according to current regulation, has been conducted on a daily basis, supposing that all days of 
the reference month present the identical conditions in terms of both consumptions and 
production. 
Moreover, all variables considered have been equally subdivided across single days on hourly 
basis, assuming that all 24 hours of a day present the same characteristics of production and 
consumptions.  
P Prob. P*Prob. Offer Cost Offer Cost*Prob. P*Prob.-Offer Cost*Prob.
243 0,82% 1,99 194 1,58 0,405
244 0,82% 1,99 194 1,58 0,413
245 0,82% 2,00 194 1,58 0,421
246 0,82% 2,01 194 1,58 0,429
247 0,82% 2,02 194 1,58 0,437
248 0,81% 2,01 194 1,57 0,442
249 0,78% 1,95 194 1,51 0,434
250 0,29% 0,72 194 0,56 0,163
251 0,29% 0,72 194 0,56 0,166
252 0,29% 0,73 194 0,56 0,169
253 0,29% 0,73 194 0,56 0,171
Optimal Offer
P (€/MWh)
January 248 € 0,81%
February 399 € 0,51%
March 348 € 0,41%
April 349 € 7,10%
May 348 € 1,98%
June 99 € 20,25%
July 99 € 13,64%
August 89 € 59,23%
September 104 € 61,48%
October 349 € 0,53%
November 349 € 0,21%
December 148 € 0,15%
Optimal Offer and Probability of Acceptance
Month
Probability of
Acceptance
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Table 14. Subdivision of Actual daily Production, Electricity Purchase and Overall Electricity Consumptions on 
hourly basis –January 2019 
 
As previously mentioned, it is assumed that UVAM is able to present 6 different upward offers 
daily, each one for 4 consecutive hours, with the same couple of price and size, as follows: 
• Price as analysed in the previous section (MSD Price Analysis) on monthly basis; 
• Size equal to 1 MWh hourly. 
Such offer is assumed to be constant along the reference month. 
 
Table 15. MSD upward offers on daily basis. Size, Price and Probability of Acceptance – January 2019 
Purchase (MWh) Electricity Consumptions (MWh)
Heat Electricity Electricity Total
1 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
2 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
3 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
4 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
5 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
6 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
7 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
8 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
9 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
10 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
11 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
12 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
13 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
14 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
15 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
16 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
17 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
18 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
19 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
20 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
21 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
22 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
23 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
24 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5
Production (MWh)
Actual
Hour
Offer (MWh) Offer (€/MWh) Prob. Of
MSD MSD Acceptance
1 1,0 248 0,8%
2 1,0 248 0,8%
3 1,0 248 0,8%
4 1,0 248 0,8%
5 1,0 248 0,8%
6 1,0 248 0,8%
7 1,0 248 0,8%
8 1,0 248 0,8%
9 1,0 248 0,8%
10 1,0 248 0,8%
11 1,0 248 0,8%
12 1,0 248 0,8%
13 1,0 248 0,8%
14 1,0 248 0,8%
15 1,0 248 0,8%
16 1,0 248 0,8%
17 1,0 248 0,8%
18 1,0 248 0,8%
19 1,0 248 0,8%
20 1,0 248 0,8%
21 1,0 248 0,8%
22 1,0 248 0,8%
23 1,0 248 0,8%
24 1,0 248 0,8%
UVAM
Hour
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UVAM’s electricity consumptions have been maintained equal to the historical data on monthly 
basis, both in case of acceptance of the presented offer on the MSD and in case of non-
acceptance. 
Thus, UVAM’s MSD participation is constrained to the maintenance of the same hourly 
electricity consumptions as observed in 2018 for all days and months considered in the 
valuation. 
Concerning the Production Unit, it is assumed that its production equals the same output 
observed in 2018 also in 2019, in terms of both heat and electricity in case of non-acceptance 
of the presented offer on the MSD. Eventual further production of electricity, necessary in order 
to accomplish dispatchment orders in case of acceptance of the offer presented on the MSD, is 
represented by the interval between the potential production and the actual production. 
Such interval of additional potential production monthly varies on the basis of the actual 
consumptions and production. As presented in the following figure, indeed, months which in 
2018 were characterised by intensive production, as winter months, present low potential upside 
of production (e.g. in January it is equal to 0,16 MWhe hourly).  
On the other hand, summer months, which in 2018 were characterised by low or null necessity 
of heat by the UVAM, and consequently low or null degree of production, present higher 
upsides of production (e.g. in April it is equal to 0,7 MWhe hourly).    
  
Figure 41. UVAM’s production Baseline and potential upside – January and April 2019 
 
Electricity dispatched on the MSD, in case of acceptance of the presented offer, is fully 
represented by the electricity produced by the cogeneration plant. Consequently, the activation 
of flexibility resources implies a reduction, in the overall consumed electricity, of the share of 
produced electricity, where present.  
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Hence, in order to maintain the same hourly electricity consumptions, it is assumed a shift 
between produced and purchased electricity to attain the overall hourly consumptions. Size and 
possibility of such variation varies along the months examined, depending on the historical data 
of both production and consumption. 
Along winter months, characterised in 2018 by intensive production, it is observed the necessity 
to increase the acquisition of electricity from external supplier, allowing to dispatch produced 
electricity on the MSD. 
 
Figure 42. UVAM’s overall Actual consumptions’ Baseline (LS) and Overall Potential consumptions’ Baseline 
and MSD offer (RS) – January 2019 
On the other hand, along summer months, characterised by low/null production, it follows a 
decrease in the acquisition of electricity from external supplier, and a partial fulfil of electricity 
consumptions by the share of electricity produced and not dispatched on the MSD. The 
remaining share of production is available for being dispatched. 
 
Figure 43. UVAM’s overall Actual consumptions’ Baseline (LS) and Overall Potential consumptions’ Baseline 
and MSD offer (RS) – July 2019 
 
Ultimately, the following tables present the overall differences between the Actual and the 
UVAM (potential) approach. Again, it is assumed that the increase of production and the shift 
in electricity consumption between purchased and produced electricity, determining an increase 
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or decrease of Electricity purchase, depends on the acceptance of the upward offer presented 
on the MSD and consequent activation of flexibility resources, with the presented probability. 
 
Table 16. UVAM’s Actual Production, Electricity Purchase and Electricity Consumptions (LS) and Potential 
Production, Electricity Purchase, Electricity Consumptions and MSD offer (RS) – January 2019 
 
Finally, the economic benefit of participating to the MSD is valued on daily basis, as the 
difference between the resulting overall costs deriving from the UVAM approach and the 
Actual overall costs. Such benefit is considered as an upside in terms of minor costs faced by 
the UVAM. 
In the Actual approach the only budget lines considered are represented by Operating Expenses 
(OpEx), in terms of: 
• Production Costs, represented by the acquisition of Natural Gas for the cogeneration 
plant; 
• Electricity Purchase, represented by the acquisition of electricity from a supplier to 
integrate produced electricity in total electricity consumptions. 
Actual approach does not generate any revenue for the UVAM, and no Capital Expenditures 
(CapEx) are considered. 
UVAM approach, on the other hand, presents two classes of revenues, determined as follows: 
• MSD Revenues, representing the valorisation of UVAM’s upward offers. Determined 
multiplying the daily overall electricity offered on the MSD by the offered price and by 
offers’ probability of acceptance; 
Purchase (MWh) Electricity Consumptions (MWh) Purchase (MWh) Electricity Consumptions (MWh) Offer (MWh) Prob. Of
Heat Electricity Electricity Total Heat Electricity Electricity Total MSD Acceptance
1 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 1 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
2 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 2 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
3 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 3 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
4 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 4 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
5 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 5 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
6 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 6 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
7 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 7 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
8 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 8 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
9 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 9 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
10 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 10 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
11 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 11 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
12 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 12 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
13 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 13 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
14 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 14 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
15 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 15 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
16 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 16 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
17 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 17 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
18 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 18 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
19 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 19 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
20 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 20 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
21 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 21 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
22 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 22 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
23 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 23 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
24 1,32 1,17 0,33 1,5 24 1,51 1,33 1,17 1,5 1,0 0,8%
Production (MWh)
Actual
Production (MWh)
UVAM
HourHour
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𝑴𝑺𝑫 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒔 = 𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃. 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 
• Fixed Remuneration, determined subdividing the overall yearly Fixed Remuneration on 
daily basis. 
Differently from Actual approach, Capital Expenditures are considered in the UVAM approach, 
regarding: 
• Adjustment Costs, determined subdividing the overall adjustment costs regarding the 
cogeneration plant on daily basis; 
• Control Room, determined subdividing the overall control room’s setting up cost on 
daily basis. 
Regarding Operating Expenses, UVAM approach presents an additional budget line compared 
to the Actual approach, represented by the Increased Maintenance relative to the cogeneration 
plant. Such cost is determined subdividing the overall yearly cost on daily basis. 
OpEx previously outlined concerning the Actual approach, present daily differences compared 
to the UVAM approach, depending on the dispatchment of electricity on the MSD. As 
previously indicated, differences in the amount of these costs depend on the probability of 
acceptance of the offers on the MSD.  
The overall higher production deriving from the optimisation of plant’s production finalised to 
the participation to the MSD, leads to higher Production Costs in all months of the valuation on 
daily basis. 
Variations between the two approaches relative to Electricity Purchase costs, differently, do not 
present a constant sign along the months analysed. Due to the shift between purchased and 
produced electricity, monthly varying on the basis of historical production and consumptions, 
Electricity Purchase costs are higher in UVAM approach along winter months. These months, 
indeed, are characterised by historical intensive production and necessity of purchasing 
electricity to participate to the MSD. Contrarily, summer months, characterised in the Actual 
approach by high amounts of Electricity Purchase, present lower expenses concerning this 
budget line in the UVAM approach. 
UVAM Case Study  Chapter 4 
 
90 
Daily upside deriving from the participation to the MSD is then determined as the difference 
between the Net Costs faced by the UVAM in the Actual approach and the Net Costs faced by 
the aggregate in the UVAM approach, obtained as follows: 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 = 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒔 − 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝑬𝒙 − 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑶𝒑𝑬𝒙 
𝑼𝒑𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 = |"𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍" 𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔| − |"𝑼𝑽𝑨𝑴" 𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔| 
In the following table it is presented the daily upside for the standard day of January 2019. 
 
Table 17. UVAM’s daily Upside by the participation to the MSD – January 2019 
 
The following figure presents the benefit of participating to the MSD for the UVAM on monthly 
basis, still in terms of minor costs faced, obtained supposing that all days composing the 
reference month present the same daily accounts. Thus, the previously exposed daily result has 
been simply multiplied for all the days of the month.  
Furthermore, it is presented the monthly record of electricity production and consumptions. As 
previously mentioned, electricity consumptions have been maintained unchanged in both 
approaches. Concerning electricity production, it has been subdivided between the self-
consumed production and the dispatched electricity on the MSD. 
It is then presented the overall differences between the UVAM and the Actual approaches in 
terms of Revenues and Costs, whose difference leads to the monthly Upside. 
January Actual UVAM
MSD Revenues -€            48€             
Fixed Remuneration -€            82€             
Total Revenues -€            130€           
Adjustment Costs -€            27)(€            
Control Room -€            14)(€            
Total CapEx -€            41)(€            
Production Costs 2.896)(€      2.899)(€      
Electricity Purchase 1.680)(€      1.714)(€      
Increased Maintenance -€            14)(€            
Total OpEx 4.576)(€      4.627)(€      
Total Costs 4.576)(€      4.668)(€      
Net Costs 4.576)(€      4.538)(€      
Upside 38€             
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Figure 44. UVAM’s monthly Upside by the participation to the MSD – January 2019 
 
4.4 VALUATION  
The overall yearly economic benefit for the UVAM deriving from the participation to the MSD, 
in terms of minor costs faced, resulted equal to 45.579€. Such outcome is the result of high 
varying monthly upsides, related to current mix of production and consumption and to MSD 
market conditions in terms of price of the offered electricity and offers’ probability of 
acceptance. 
Starting from the highlighted assumptions, April resulted as the most profitable month along 
2019, with a monthly upside equal to 12.145 € (26,6% of total upside). Such result is determined 
by the high offer’s price and relatively high probability of acceptance identified, as well as by 
the low Offer Cost considered. Also September (22,2% of total upside) showed high profitable 
results, due to the highest probability of acceptance considered (61,5%). 
Production (MWh) Production (MWh)
Electricity 867,9 Electricity 866,9
Consumed 861,9 Consumed 866,9
Dispatched on the MSD 6,0 MSD 0,0
Purchase (MWh) Purchase (MWh)
Electricity 251,9 Electricity 246,8
Total Consumptions (MWh) Total Consumptions (MWh)
Electricity 1.113,8 Electricity 1.113,8
Revenues (€) OpEx (€)
MSD 1.496,2 Natural Gas (89.773)
Fixed Remuneration 2.547,9 Electricity (52.077)
TOTAL 4.044,1 TOTAL (141.850)
CapEx (€) Total Costs (€)
Adjustment Costs (849,3) TOTAL (141.850)
Control Room (424,7)
TOTAL (1.274)
OpEx (€)
Natural Gas (89.875)
Electricity (53.143)
Increased Maintenance (425)
TOTAL (143.442) Δ Revenues 4.044 € 
Total Costs (€) Δ Costs (2.866 €)
TOTAL (144.716)
Upside 1.178 € 
Net Costs (€)
TOTAL (140.672) Upside % 0,84%
UVAM
January January
Actual
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Being December’s result influenced by the absence of MB’s data, and consequently not being 
fully investigated with possibilities of underestimation, the least profitable month considered is 
November (2,4% of total upside). Such low profitability results from the lowest offer’s 
probability of acceptance (0,21%), excluding December, and from a high Offer Cost. 
As clear from the following figure, summer months present the highest monthly upsides (Q2-
2019 represents the 44% of total upside, Q3-2019 represents the 40%) due to the higher 
potential of additional production and lower Offer Cost, leading to lower offers’ prices and 
higher probabilities of acceptance. 
On the other hand, winter months, characterised by a current intensive production and low 
margin for additional production, present high Offer Costs, and current market conditions 
generate low offers’ probability of acceptance. As a consequence, both Q1-2019 and Q4-2019 
represents about the 8% of total yearly upside generated for the UVAM by the participation to 
the MSD. 
 
Figure 45. UVAM’s monthly Upsides – 2019 
 
On the basis of the previously exposed methodology, UVAM approach, compared to the Actual 
approach, presents the following differences and findings: 
• Production 
The UVAM approach presents an overall production of electricity significantly higher 
compared to the Actual approach (+32,4%), further subdivided between consumed electricity 
(only use of produced electricity in Actual approach) and Dispatched electricity on the MSD. 
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o Consumed electricity, equal to 5.162,8 MWh, +7,2% on the Actual approach 
(81% of produced electricity). 
o Dispatched electricity on the MSD, equal to 1.215,6 MWh (19% of produced 
electricity), present only in the UVAM approach. 
 
• Purchase of Electricity 
The overall amount of purchased electricity is lower in the case of UVAM approach (-3,5% on 
the Actual approach), due to the increase of consumed electricity derived from the additional 
production. 
• Total Consumptions 
As previously mentioned, total consumptions in terms of electricity have been considered equal 
across the two analysed approaches. 
• Revenues 
As previously illustrated, total revenues in the UVAM approach are subdivided between the 
revenues derived from the dispatchment of electricity on the MSD (138.717,5 €, 82% of total 
revenues) and the Fixed Remuneration, provided by the current regulation, relative to the 
assigned and made available on the MSD capacity (30.000 €, 18% of total revenues). On the 
other hand, not being provided any market participation, Actual approach do not present any 
kind of revenue. 
• CapEx 
CapEx considered in the UVAM approach, relative to the cogeneration plant’s adjustments and 
the setting up of a control room, amount to 15.000 €. No CapEx were considered in the Actual 
approach. 
• OpEx 
Total Operating Expenses in the UVAM approach amount to 2.280.072 € on yearly basis, with 
an increase of 108.138 € (+5% on Actual approach) compared to the Actual approach, due to 
the increase of natural gas consumptions’ costs (+32,4%), compensated by a slight reduction in 
the overall cost of purchase of electricity from supplier (-3,5%), as predictable because of the 
reduction in the overall purchase of electricity previously exposed. Furthermore, UVAM 
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approach present OpEx relative to the increased maintenance’s costs, equal to 5.000 €, not taken 
into consideration in the Actual approach and contributing to the increase of total OpEx. 
• Total Costs 
The increase of total OpEx and the introduction of CapEx lead to an increase in total costs in 
the UVAM approach compared to the Actual approach. Such increase is equal to 123.138 € on 
yearly basis (+5,7% on Actual approach). 
• Upside 
The overall difference between the two approaches and resulting Upside in terms of minor costs 
faced by the UVAM, is thus equal to 45.579 € (-2,14% of costs on the Actual approach), 
resulting from the difference between the Net Costs in the Actual approach and Net Costs in 
the UVAM approach. 
 
Figure 46. Yearly Upside by the participation to the MSD – 2019 
 
Production (MWh) Production (MWh)
Electricity 6.378,4 Electricity 4.816,4
Consumed 5.162,8 Consumed 4.816,4
Dispatched on the MSD 1.215,6 MSD 0,0
Purchase (MWh) Purchase (MWh)
Electricity 9.423,7 Electricity 9.770,1
Total Consumptions (MWh) Total Consumptions (MWh)
Electricity 14.586,5 Electricity 14.586,5
Revenues (€) OpEx (€)
MSD 138.717,5 Natural Gas (498.745,7)
Fixed Remuneration 30.000,0 Electricity (1.673.187,5)
TOTAL 168.717,5 TOTAL (2.171.933)
CapEx (€) Total Costs (€)
Adjustment Costs (10.000,0) TOTAL (2.171.933)
Control Room (5.000,0)
TOTAL (15.000)
OpEx (€)
Natural Gas (660.500,0)
Electricity (1.614.571,6)
Increased Maintenance (5.000,0)
TOTAL (2.280.072) Δ Revenues 168.717 € 
Total Costs (€) Δ Costs (123.138 €)
TOTAL (2.295.072)
Upside 45.579 € 
Net Costs (€)
TOTAL (2.126.354) Upside % 2,14%
Actual
Full Year Full Year
UVAM
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Hence, even if the participation to the MSD for the analysed UVAM presents an economic 
benefit for the analysed aggregate of Production and Consumption units, it is considered as 
marginal in its management.  
It has to be considered, indeed, the necessary subdivision of the value created across the units 
aggregated and the Aggregator, whose presence is considered as fundamental for the 
competitive participation of the aggregate on the MSD. Such breakdown would minimise the 
economic benefit for the stakeholders of the UVAM, grating minimum compensation, whatever 
is the approached model of value-sharing. 
Being the maximum potential production lower than the overall electricity consumptions, with 
varying spreads across the different months analysed, the valuated UVAM cannot constantly 
guarantee a proper flexibility, given the constant necessity of providing electricity from external 
sources in case of dispatchment of production. 
Hence, the relation between such necessity, the high costs faced by the UVAM both in terms 
of production and purchase of electricity, and the current MSD market conditions, do not allow 
for high profitability in the participation to the MSD.  
Firstly because of the high production cost and Opportunity cost of shifting the produced 
electricity from consumptions to dispatchment, which lead the UVAM to require high 
compensation of dispatched electricity on the MSD, due to the significant price difference 
between purchase (from supplier) and sale of electricity (on the MSD) on the Italian power 
market. 
Secondly, current MSD market, especially market zone NORD, highlights average upward 
prices which do not allow for a significant valorisation of the dispatched electricity in case of 
high price offers, which are related to remarkably low probabilities of acceptance for the 
presented offers. 
In conclusion, to be significantly profitable and reasonably affect UVAM’s budget, the 
participation to the MSD for an aggregate requires the availability of a considerable share of 
production (or consumption) to be dispatched on the market. Such availability, indeed, provides 
low marginal costs to be faced and a truly competitive participation to the MSD, as observed in 
the present Case Study along summer months, characterised by higher potential upside of 
production.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The evolution of the Italian power market, challenged along last decade, introduced new grid’s 
management issues concerning short-term planning and safe operation of the system. 
Decentralisation and decarbonisation are indeed driving greater penetration of Distributed and 
Renewable Energy Sources and the subsequent need for greater system awareness, forecasting, 
and intelligence, requiring the development of new flexibility services. As widely discussed, 
constant balancing between loads and generation has indeed become a critical issue for TSO in 
recent years and it is set to worsen due to the increasing penetration of Renewable Energy 
Sources, still disincentivised to supply dispatchment services because of their intermittent and 
not-predictable production. There consequently needs new resources to be employed in the 
ancillary services market. 
The introduction of new market models and dynamics, as in the case of Demand-Response 
market, can represent a significant improvement in the current Italian power market scenario, 
leading to the inclusion of new subject in the market of flexibility services. Currently, there is 
growing consensus that Demand-Response is a significant source for realising an efficient and 
sustainable electricity system at a reasonable cost. Demand-Response is indeed recognised as a 
critical facilitator of security of supply, renewables integration, improved market competition 
and consumer empowerment. 
By Resolution 300/2017/R/eel “Prima apertura del mercato per il servizio di dispacciamento 
(MSD)” the Italian Authority defined the criteria to allow for the participation of consumption 
units and production units until now excluded (i.e. not-relevant units, consumption units, 
relevant units powered by RES) to the MSD in order to provide balancing services.  
Current regulatory barriers and market conditions, in order to maximise the potentialities of 
Demand-Response, requires participants to converge in an aggregate of different 
generation/consumption units, being the individual participation, although theoretically 
possible, highly impractical due to operative and regulatory barriers (e.g. Italian regulation 
provides a minimum quantity to be offered equal to 1 MW). Thus, the participation of 
Distributed Energy Generation (DER) resources currently requires the constitution of the so-
called Virtual Power Plants (VPP). 
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Therefore, the participation to the ancillary services market is endorsed, by Resolution 300/17, 
on aggregated basis, by the constitution of the so-called Unità Virtuali Abilitate (UVA), setting 
up the first initiative to introduce the Demand-Response mechanism in the Italian power market. 
In particular UVAM (Unità Virtuali Abilitate Miste) represented the main object of analysis of 
the present thesis, because of the possibility, provided by the current regulation, of aggregating 
consumption and production units in the same Mixed aggregate for the dispatchment of 
flexibility services on the MSD market. 
Once analysed the different potential flexibility resources, it has been examined the recently 
introduced mechanisms of new ancillary services’ dispatchment, illustrating the roles of the 
different subjects included in the new framework. In particular, it has been analysed the figure 
of the Aggregator, fundamental for the aggregation of little production and consumption units 
and necessary for the maximisation of flexibility’s value. The Aggregator will indeed assume 
a central role of interface with TSO and DSO in the supply of flexibility services by little units 
(producers or consumers) connected to the distribution grid, facilitating the creation of a 
significative resource for the TSO. By the Aggregator’s intermediation, services offered would 
result in a higher quality, because more certain, and would amplify the management of the 
electric system making the metering of the resources offered more efficient. 
Particular relevance, concerning the potential improvements in market participation, is 
represented by loads’ inclusion in the dispatchment of flexibility services. Modulating loads, 
indeed, can lead to offer the same services currently offered by generating units, widening the 
quantity of possible participants to the ancillary services market and consequently the quantity 
of possible resources. Indeed, resources currently offered by generators can be put in place, 
with opposite sign, also by loads. Upward trades, which in case of generating units correspond 
to an increase of electricity’s injection by an increase of production, in case of modulating loads 
correspond to a reduction of the off-takes from the grid, producing the same balancing effect. 
The opposite applies in case of downward trades. Consequently, loads and generation can be 
complementary on the MSD. 
It the Case Study developed in the present thesis, it has been analysed the economic benefit 
deriving from the participation to the MSD for an UVAM, on the basis of current regulation. 
The analysed UVAM was composed by the aggregation of 1 Production Unit (a cogeneration 
plant) and 14 Consumption Units supplied by the aggregated plant. 
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The realised analysis presents low profitability from the participation to the MSD for the 
considered UVAM. Firstly because of the high costs faced by the UVAM in order to provide 
flexibility resources and secondly because of the highlighted current MSD market conditions, 
presenting average upward prices which currently do not allow for a significant valorisation of 
the dispatched electricity in case of high price offers, related to remarkably low probabilities of 
acceptance. 
It has been stressed the necessity, in order to generate significant profits and reasonably affect 
UVAM’s budget, of a considerable share of additional production to be dispatched on the 
market, exceeding the share of internal consumptions. Such availability, indeed, provides low 
marginal costs to be faced and a truly competitive participation to the MSD. The present 
necessity has been proven regarding cogeneration plants, but it holds for every kind of 
productive units. 
Certainly, some regulatory barriers currently shrink the profitability of the new aggregate 
qualified to the MSD. Not being allowed the presentation of downward offers by UVAM, the 
full range of profits’ potentialities cannot be reached by current Pilot Projects provided by Terna 
in case of mixed aggregates as provided by UVAM’s regulation. 
Nevertheless, the currently high system charges, which significantly increase the cost of 
acquisition of electricity, do not incentivise grid off-takes. In particular, in order to make grid 
off-takes economically convenient for downward balancing of consumptions, system charges 
should be excluded in case of activation of flexibility services, in order to equate both 
production and consumption units in every condition. 
Moreover, current regulation does not incentivise the participation of RES to the MSD, both 
for regulatory (limits in RES participation in UVAM aggregates) and economic barriers. RES 
currently produce electricity at maximum productivity, because of null marginal costs of 
production and as a consequence of the economic merit order provided on the MGP, which 
guarantees dispatchment priority for RES (often RES production also gain fee-in tariffs). In 
case of participation to the MSD, the provision of upward flexibility services presupposes, for 
RES, a reduction of production in order to guarantee a potential upside in case of reception of 
dispatchment orders by Terna. Nonetheless, the uncertainty in the valorisation of offered 
electricity on the MSD due to the current offers’ acceptation methodology, do not give any 
incentive in the provision of flexibility resources by RES. Further reduction in storage system 
costs, as well as the possibility of presenting downward offers with negative prices, could 
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provide in the near future new incentive for the participation of RES in the ancillary services 
market. 
To encourage a significant spread of the new aggregates participating to the ancillary services 
market, it is considered necessary to maintain the currently provided dual remuneration, with a 
fixed remuneration (for the availability of capacity) and a variable remuneration (for the 
activation of flexibility resources). Actually, the inclusion on the MSD market of new 
participants can be granted only by a certain remuneration for the capacity made available on 
the market. Such fixed remuneration would allow for the infrastructural investments necessary 
to allow major flexibility of both consumption and production units until now excluded from 
the dispatchment of such services. In absence of a capacity remuneration, new participants 
would consequently rely only on the possible remuneration of offered electricity, making the 
qualification and participation to the MSD riskier. 
In conclusion, a considerable participation on the MSD market by the new qualified units and 
aggregates, besides supplying the necessary resources for the safe operation of the grid, can 
bring many advantages to the electric system. In particular, it could allow for a new 
implementation of resources already available and not sufficiently exploited due to current 
power market conditions. Indeed, not relevant traditional plants, currently not competitive on 
the MGP, could achieve renewed profitability by the participation to the MSD considering the 
new offered possibilities, considering their characteristic production’s scalability. Additionally, 
a significant participation can mitigate management issues currently faced by the TSO and 
integrate, by additional legislative measures, RES within the view of forthcoming 
decarbonisation. Furthermore, an increase of flexibility resources on the MSD market, would 
increase market’s competitivity by additional offer that can contribute in lowering current 
ancillary services’ prices, with several benefits, as reducing the costs for system’s management 
faced by the TSO and consequently lower system charges for the community.  
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APPENDIX 
1. MSD EX-ANTE FUNDAMENTALS AND HISTORICAL DATA 
Zone - CENTRO-NORD 
Market zone CENTRO-NORD, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, represented the 3% of 
total trades along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity equal 
to 44 GWh (21 GWh upward and 23 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was 
observed in June 2016, with 96 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante (14 GWh 
upward and 82 GWh downward), whilst the minimum was registered in October 2018, with 15 
GWh of electricity traded (12 GWh upward and 3 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 94,9 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 164,2 €/MWh 
in January 2017 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 69,9 €/MWh in August 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed a steady 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 42,5 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 90,4 
€/MWh in January 2017 and a minimum spread of 27,3 €/MWh in July 2018. Furthermore, the 
two prices show a positive strong correlation along last three years (Correlation coefficient 
equal to 0,73). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 25,7 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 6,6 €/MWh in April 2016 and 
a maximum monthly average price equal to 43,3 €/MWh in December 2018. Downward price 
and zonal price showed a positive strong correlation along the reference period (Correlation 
coefficient equal to 0,77). 
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Figure 47. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
CENTRO-NORD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Zone - CENTRO-SUD 
Market zone CENTRO-SUD, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, the 6,6% of total trades 
along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity equal to 98 GWh 
(73 GWh upward and 25 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in April 
2016, with 203 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante (143 GWh upward and 60 GWh 
downward), whilst the minimum was registered in September 2017, with 28 GWh of electricity 
traded (21 GWh upward and 7 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 184,1 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 337,7 €/MWh 
in April 2018 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 80,2 €/MWh in July 2017. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed an irregular 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 130,6 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 
292,5 €/MWh in April 2017 and a minimum spread of 32,6 €/MWh in July 2017. Furthermore, 
the two prices show a positive though very weak correlation along last three years (Correlation 
coefficient equal to 0,17). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 20 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 3,8 €/MWh in April 2018 and 
a maximum monthly average price equal to 48,8 €/MWh in September 2018. Downward price 
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and zonal price showed a positive strong correlation along the reference period (Correlation 
coefficient equal to 0,83). 
 
Figure 48. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
CENTRO-SUD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Zone – SUD 
Market zone SUD, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, represented the 0,3% of total trades 
along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity equal to 5 GWh 
(1,5 GWh upward and 3,5 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in May 
2016, with 26 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante (7 GWh upward and 19 GWh 
downward), whilst the minimum was registered in July 2017, with 0,1 GWh of electricity traded 
(0,05 GWh upward and 0,05 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 165,4 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 353 €/MWh 
in May 2017 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 85 €/MWh in February 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed an irregular 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 117,4 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 
310 €/MWh in May 2017 and a minimum spread of 37,8 €/MWh in August 2018. Furthermore, 
the two prices show almost null correlation along last three years (Correlation coefficient equal 
to 0,06). 
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The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 0,2 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 0 €/MWh in different months 
along the reference period and a maximum monthly average price equal to 3,8 €/MWh in 
September 2018. Downward price and zonal price showed a positive tough weak correlation 
along the reference period (Correlation coefficient equal to 0,43). 
 
Figure 49. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
SUD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Zone – SICILIA 
Market zone SICILIA, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, represented the 12,1% of total 
trades along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity equal to 180 
GWh (172 GWh upward and 8 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in 
March 2016, with 302 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante (292 GWh upward and 
10 GWh downward), whilst the minimum was registered in December 2018, with 70 GWh of 
electricity traded (69 GWh upward and 1 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 107,7 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 150,2 €/MWh 
in November 2018 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 47,2 €/MWh in April 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed a steady 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 48,1 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 90,7 
€/MWh in July 2016 and a minimum spread of 8,7 €/MWh in January 2016. Furthermore, the 
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two prices show a positive correlation along last three years (Correlation coefficient equal to 
0,67). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 26,7 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 9,5 €/MWh in May 2018 and 
a maximum monthly average price equal to 55,4 €/MWh in March 2016. Downward price and 
zonal price showed a negative correlation along the reference period (Correlation coefficient 
equal to -0,08). 
 
Figure 50. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
SICILIA, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
Zone – SARDEGNA 
Market zone SARDEGNA, concerning trades on the MSD Ex-Ante, represented the 6,4% of 
total trades along last three years, with an average monthly volume of traded electricity equal 
to 95 GWh (94,5 GWh upward and 0,5 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was 
observed in February 2016, with 266,2 GWh of electricity traded on the MSD Ex-Ante, entirely 
upward, whilst the minimum was registered in December 2016, with 9 GWh of electricity 
traded, also in this case entirely upward. 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 115,2 €/MWh, highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 283,5 €/MWh 
in January 2016 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 56,6 €/MWh in January 2016. 
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Such impressive is attributable to arbitrage dynamics which took place in this market zone until 
June of 2016. 
Consequently, in the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) 
showed an irregular price’s spread, with an average value equal to 64,5 €/MWh, showing a 
maximum spread of 245,1 €/MWh in March 2016 and a minimum spread of 9,4 €/MWh in 
January 2016. Furthermore, the two prices show a negative correlation along last three years 
(Correlation coefficient equal to -0,42). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 26,7 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 0 €/MWh in November 2016 
and December 2017 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 71,3 €/MWh in October 
2018. Downward price and zonal price showed a positive touch very weak correlation along 
the reference period (Correlation coefficient equal to 0,29). 
 
Figure 51. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MSD Ex-Ante and Zonal Price in market zone 
SARDEGNA, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
 
2. MB FUNDAMENTALS AND HISTORICAL DATA 
Zone - CENTRO-NORD 
Market zone CENTRO-NORD, concerning trades on the MB, represented the 2,5% of total 
trades along last three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity traded equal to 31 
GWh (7 GWh upward and 24 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in 
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March 2017, with 62 GWh of electricity traded on the MB (7 GWh upward and 55 GWh 
downward), whilst the minimum was registered in September 2018, with 4 GWh of electricity 
traded (1,5 GWh upward and 2,5 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 104,2 €/MWh (+9,8% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average price 
equal to 174 €/MWh in November 2016 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 72 
€/MWh in March 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed a steady 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 51,8 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 
117,6 €/MWh in November 2016 and a minimum spread of 29,8 €/MWh in September 2018. 
Furthermore, the two prices show a positive though weak correlation along last three years 
(Correlation equal to 0,57). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 26,3 
€/MWh (+2,3% on Ex-Ante), highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 13,3 
€/MWh in May 2016 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 44,8 €/MWh in October 
2018. Downward prices and zonal prices showed a positive strong correlation along the 
reference period (Correlation equal to 0,87). 
 
Figure 52. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone CENTRO-
NORD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
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Zone - CENTRO-SUD 
Market zone CENTRO-SUD, concerning trades on the MB, represented the 13,6% of total 
trades along last three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity traded equal to 174 
GWh (30 GWh upward and 144 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed 
in May 2016, with 372 GWh of electricity traded on the MB (37 GWh upward and 335 GWh 
downward), whilst the minimum was registered in June 2017, with 74 GWh of electricity traded 
(12 GWh upward and 62 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered was equal to 213,5 €/MWh 
(+16% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal to 352,7 €/MWh 
in April 2018 and a minimum equal to 120,6 €/MWh in August 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices showed a steady price’s spread, 
with an average value equal to 160,5 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 302,1 €/MWh in 
April 2018 and a minimum spread of 80,2 €/MWh in January 2017. Furthermore, the two prices 
show almost null correlation along last three years (Correlation equal to 0,16). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 18,6 
€/MWh (-7% on Ex-Ante), highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 5,5 €/MWh 
in May 2016 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 42,7 €/MWh in September 2018. 
Downward prices and zonal prices showed a positive strong correlation along the reference 
period (Correlation equal to 0,86). 
 
Figure 53. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone CENTRO-
SUD, 2016-2018. Source: GME 
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Zone – SUD 
Market zone SUD presents a marginal amount of trades concerning the MB, representing less 
than the 0,1% of total trades last three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity 
traded equal to 0,4 GWh (0,1 GWh upward and 0,3 GWh downward), not presenting any trade 
in 16 months of the reference period. 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 110,4 €/MWh (-33% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average price 
equal to 260 €/MWh in December 2017 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 50 
€/MWh in July 2018. 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 4,5 
€/MWh, highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 0,1 €/MWh in May 2017 and 
a maximum monthly average price equal to 40,2 €/MWh in December 2018.  
 
Figure 54. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone SUD, 2016-
2018. Source: GME 
 
Zone – SICILIA 
Market zone SICILIA, concerning trades on the MB, represented the 3,6% of total trades along 
last three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity traded equal to 46 GWh (35 
GWh upward and 11 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in August 
2016, with 105 GWh of electricity traded on the MB (86 GWh upward and 19 GWh downward), 
  
112 
whilst the minimum was registered in March 2018, with 15 GWh of electricity traded (11 GWh 
upward and 4 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, the monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was 
equal to 102,1 €/MWh (-5,2% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average price 
equal to 177,6 €/MWh in September 2018 and a minimum monthly average price equal to 54,1 
€/MWh in April 2016. 
In the reference period, average upward prices and zonal prices (on MGP) showed an increasing 
price’s spread, with an average value equal to 42,4 €/MWh, showing a maximum spread of 96,8 
€/MWh in September 2018 and a minimum spread of 13,2 €/MWh in January 2016. 
Furthermore, the two prices show a positive strong correlation along last three years 
(Correlation equal to 0,80). 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 31,6 
€/MWh (+18% on Ex-Ante), highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 10,1 
€/MWh in September 2016 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 49,1 €/MWh in 
March 2018. Downward prices and zonal prices showed a positive touch very weak correlation 
along the reference period (Correlation equal to 0,14). 
 
Figure 55.Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone SICILIA, 
2016-2018. Source: GME 
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Zone – SARDEGNA 
Market zone SARDEGNA, concerning trades on the MB, represented the 2,3% of total trades 
along last three years, with an average monthly volume of electricity traded equal to 29 GWh 
(9 GWh upward and 20 GWh downward). The peak of monthly trades was observed in July 
2018, with 92 GWh of electricity traded on the MB (22 GWh upward and 69 GWh downward), 
whilst the minimum was registered in February 2016, with 11 GWh of electricity traded (5 
GWh upward and 6 GWh downward). 
Concerning prices, monthly average upward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal 
to 165,4 €/MWh (+44% on the Ex-Ante), highlighting a maximum monthly average price equal 
to 282,9 €/MWh in May 2016 and a minimum equal to 100,8 €/MWh in March 2016. 
Concerning the relation between average upward prices and zonal prices, SARDEGNA market 
zone present the same controversy highlighted about the Ex-Ante market because of arbitrage 
issues. The maximum spread was equal to 245,5 €/MWh in May 2016 and the minimum was 
equal to of 46,8 €/MWh in December 2017. 
The average monthly downward price registered between 2016 and 2018 was equal to 28,4 
€/MWh (+6,4% on Ex-Ante), highlighting a minimum monthly average price equal to 6,5 
€/MWh in August 2016 and a maximum monthly average price equal to 59,8 €/MWh in 
November 2018. Downward prices and zonal prices showed a positive correlation along the 
reference period (Correlation equal to 0,70). 
 
Figure 56. Upward and downward volumes and prices on the MB and Zonal Price in market zone SARDEGNA, 
2016-2018. Source: GME 
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3. MSD PRICE ANALYSIS 
February 
 
Figure 57. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – February 2018 
 
 
Figure 58. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – February 2018 
 
 
Table 18.  Maximum offer value – February 
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Figure 59. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – March 2018 
 
 
Figure 60. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – March 2018 
 
 
Table 19.  Maximum offer value – March 
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Figure 61. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – April 2018 
 
 
Figure 62. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – April 2018 
 
 
Table 20.  Maximum offer value – April 
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Figure 63. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – May 2018 
 
 
Figure 64. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – May 2018 
 
 
Table 21. Maximum offer value – May 
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Figure 65. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – June 2018 
 
 
Figure 66. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – June 2018 
 
 
Table 22. Maximum offer value – June 
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Figure 67. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – July 2018 
 
 
Figure 68. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – July 2018 
 
 
Table 23. Maximum offer value – July 
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Figure 69. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – August 2018 
 
 
Figure 70. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – August 2018 
 
 
Table 24. Maximum offer value – August 
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Figure 71. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – September 2018 
 
 
Figure 72. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – September 2018 
 
 
Table 25. Maximum offer value – September 
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Figure 73. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – October 2018 
 
 
Figure 74. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – October 2018 
 
 
Table 26. Maximum offer value – October 
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Figure 75. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – November 2018 
 
 
Figure 76. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – November 2018 
 
 
Table 27. Maximum offer value – November 
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Figure 77. Standardised Accepted Offers per Price (Including Zeros) – December 2018 
 
 
Figure 78. PDF of Standardised Accepted Offers (LS) and Probability of Acceptance (RS) – December 2018 
 
 
Table 28. Maximum offer value – December 
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143 0,15% 0,21 132 0,20 0,017
144 0,15% 0,22 132 0,20 0,018
145 0,15% 0,22 132 0,20 0,020
146 0,15% 0,22 132 0,20 0,021
147 0,15% 0,22 132 0,20 0,023
148 0,15% 0,22 132 0,20 0,024
149 0,00% 0,00 132 0,00 0,0001
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